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2Front Cover: A Queen termite of the family Macrotermes carbonarius, a fungus-growing termite species that is widespread in South-
east Asia, is being extensively groomed by workers. The swollen abdomen cripples the queen’s movement so she largely depends on 
workers for food as well as maintaining her hygiene.
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“Care” in Southeast Asia: Every Day and into the Future
The Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University is accepting proposals from independent, 
young and upcoming fi lmmakers from Southeast Asia to make and submit documentaries which deal with 
the topic of “care.”
Care is fundamental to human co-existence and mutuality. At the heart of this view of care is a relational 
perspective on human existence. Yet care is a western term that has no exact corresponding term in Asian 
languages. We hope that this project will stimulate Southeast Asian fi lmmakers into considering the rel-
evance and meaning of care in their own societies. 
Over the last 30 years, demographic changes in the region have led to a reorganization of social rela-
tions. How individuals, families and communities cope with the issue of care has become an increasingly 
important issue. Diff erent forms of care exist in diff erent cultural and social settings and the young, elderly 
and disabled all receive care and exert a moral claim to it.
The practice of care produces relations between the cared and carers in various social contexts. It is a 
lived practice concerned with the physical and psychosocial needs of particular persons. Relationships 
are formed by recognizing that bodies and their care at diff erent stages in the human lifecycle form a 
fundamental foundation for the construction of societies. In Southeast Asia, these relationships are highly 
diverse and diff erent care practices vary from country to country. In part this arises from unstable policy 
and institutional support.
We are accepting proposals from independent, young and upcoming fi lmmakers from Southeast Asia 
on documentaries which deal with the topic of care. The deadline for submission is 25 January 2013. 
http://sea-sh.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/visual_documentary_project/ 
For more information please contact Mario Lopez marioivanlopez@cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp
and Jafar Suryomenggolo jafar@cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp 
Photo Credit: Dave Lumenta
VISUAL DOCUMENTARY PROJECT
Editorial  ..........................................................................................................................................  4
Eating from the Same Bowl: 
Japanese Reflections of Southeast Asian Studies
Tanaka Koji .......................................................................................................................................  5
Inequality in Thailand and Japan
Pasuk Phongpaichit  ..................................................................................................................  10
Myanmar’s ASEAN Chairmanship in 2014: 
Legitimacy, Salvation and Interests
Pavin Chachavalpongpun  ......................................................................................................  13
Termites’ Merciless Acts of Respect 
toward their Sick and Dead Nestmates
Kok-Boon Neoh  ..........................................................................................................................  17
Sustainable use of Rich Bird Diversity in “Biomass Society”
Motoko S. Fujita  .........................................................................................................................  19
From Dead Zone to Destination: 
Tourism and the Charting of the BIMP-EAGA Subregion
Lou Antolihao, Hiromu Shimizu  ...........................................................................................  22
Locating ‘Green Neoliberalism,’ and Other Forms of  
Environmental Governance in Southeast Asia
Keith Barney  ................................................................................................................................  25
Southeast Asia’s New High Rollers
Gianluca Bonanno  ....................................................................................................................  29
Publications  ...............................................................................................................................  31
Visiting Fellows  ........................................................................................................................  33
4Equatorial Southeast Asia has been undergoing immense 
change over the past 20 years. With the economic rise of nations 
in the region, its resources have come to be seen in market terms 
and this has led to unprecedented resource extraction. The area 
is remarkably rich in biodiversity and plays an important role in 
atmospheric and oceanic circulation. Yet, human interventions 
into large parts of Borneo, Sumatra, and parts of Malaysia have 
exacted a toll on the environment. These interventions appear 
to be one-sided as rapid socio-economic transformations im-
pact upon multiple ecologies. The conversion of large swaths of 
forest into oil palm plantations has, at the level of the region, af-
fected the atmosphere, the circulation of water, soil, plants, and 
animals. Once untouched areas become natural resources they 
are seen in terms of market revenue to be rapidly extracted. The 
changes these kinds of extraction have entailed have led to vast 
landscape and infrastructure transformations with subsequent 
biodiversity loss. 
There is a crucial need to appraise how non-human species, 
- the biotic living factors of other species - also play a role in 
ecosystem maintenance and even within their own communi-
ties in high biomass societies such as equatorial Southeast Asia. 
In this issue we present a number of articles by scholars who 
conduct ecosystem research in Southeast Asia. Kok-Boon Neoh, 
an entomologist, shows us how termites, within their own com-
munities, play a valuable role in supporting human societies. 
Kok-Boon, whose research interests’ lie in looking at how termite 
and ant communities change along with agricultural intensifica-
tion practices and urbanization, shows us how they care for the 
injured and deal with dead colony members. 
Fujita Motoko, an ecologist, presents an intriguing and de-
tailed look at human-nature interactions by showing how birds 
and the harvesting of their nests in Borneo have played an inte-
gral part in the cultural practices of the Iban and Kayan people 
in the region. Although there has been continuing biodiversity 
and ecological decline which has led to the near extinction of 
some bird species due to overexploitation, Fujita shows how 
some new bird farming techniques led to a recuperation of 
some bird stocks. 
What these articles highlight is the urgent need to pay more 
attention to human-nature interactions. The consequences of 
human intervention to supply resources to markets in order to 
develop regions for short-term growth objectives can literally 
write away the intricate processes of insect and bird commu-
nities that form integral parts of ecosystems. Taking a more 
detailed approach toward human societies finding ways to co-
exist with other species in high-biomass equatorial South-east 
Asia will require new avenues of inquiry that incorporate multi-
disciplinary tactics as above. 
The Editors
In the News
CSEAS has had a busy half year since the last newsletter. On 
May 7, 2012, a delegation of representatives from the house of 
representatives, Myanmar, visited the Center for Southeast Asian 
Studies. Seven representatives, including the Chairman of the 
Upper House, H. E. U Khin Aung Myint, the deputy Chairman, 
and five others exchanged opinions and pleasantries to foster 
understanding between Myanmar and Japan. 
On July 9, 2012, an eleven-person delegation headed by H.E. 
Vice Minister Nghiem Vu Khai of Vietnam’s Ministry of Science and 
Technology and including Members of the National Assembly’s 
Committee of Science, Technology and Environment, Drs. Le 
Hong Tinh, Tran Van Minh, and Thon Thi Ngoc Hanh, visited the 
CSEAS for a dialogue with CSEAS faculty as well as faculty from 
other units of Kyoto University to exchange views on promot-
ing research collaboration and exchange between Vietnam and 
Japan through partnership among their academic institutions.
CSEAS has also ratified Memorandums of Understanding 
(MOUs) with the Ministry of Health, the Kingdom of Bhutan; 
The School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Nanyang 
Technological University, Republic of Singapore; The School 
of Asia-Pacific Studies and the School of Government, Sun 
Yat-Sen University, People’s Republic of China; The Institute for 
Southeast Asian Studies, Jinan University, People’s Republic of 
China: Gorontalo State University, Republic of Indonesia; and 
The International Institute for Asian Studies, Leiden, Kingdom of 
the Netherlands. 
Editorial
Delegation from Myanmar on a visit to the Center for Southeast Asian Studies
5At present, organizations and research projects that aspire to carry out multidisciplinary research are becoming de 
riguer. Nonetheless, in order to achieve meaningful research results, many areas remain to be dealt with. The Center 
for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS), Kyoto University, has promoted an area studies which includes the natural sci-
ences and professor Tanaka Koji, a former director of the Center, played a decisive and commanding role in this. As one 
of the previous directors, he oversaw the transition of the Center from its previous incarnation to its current organiza-
tional form. As a leader of numerous research projects, he pioneered his own unique studies based upon agriculture. 
From the 1970s, Prof. Tanaka immersed himself in a multidisciplinary environment which extended beyond his own 
field where his results influenced other scholars around him. In this interview, visiting associate Prof. Tomita Shinsuke 
interviews Prof. Tanaka on his experiences that he had at CSEAS. 




 (Senior Research Adminstrator, Kyoto University, 
Former Director of CSEAS)
Interview by Tomita Shinsuke
 (Visiting Associate Professor, CSEAS)
Cropping System Research: Learning from Agriculture
Tomita: Firstly, let me ask about your research background. 
When you first started out, you were an assistant professor at the 
Experimental Farm, Kyoto University, located in Takatsuki City, 
Osaka. What kind of research did you do at that time?
Tanaka: The farm was a place that offered student practice as well 
as farming management. It is a farm perfectly suited to letting 
people experience agricultural work. In particular, for researchers 
who have a background in crop science and agronomy, it is a very 
good facility to experience actual farming management. While I 
was at the farm, I didn’t really do any experimental studies. When 
I was employed, I was only there for one year and three months, 
and I helped the technical staff with farm work.
Tomita: Was this mainly working in the field?
Tanaka: I didn’t really do anything that amounted to research so I 
decided to mainly drive a tractor and help with various tasks. 
Tomita: So you weren’t involved in doing farming at that time?
Tanaka: That’s correct. However, I did do some practical experi-
ments on the direct-seeding cultivation of rice in large agricultural 
fields. We shipped out the rice that we harvested. I remem-
ber that it felt as if I were merely trying my hand at agricultural 
management. 
Tomita: When you became an assistant professor at the Faculty of 
Agriculture, what did you do at the time?
Tanaka: I was working at the crop science laboratory. I also helped 
manage the Kyoto Farm, but I mainly did research on cropping 
systems and mixed cropping systems.
Tomita: Did these kinds of research bring cropping and mixed 
cropping systems research in Asia and Southeast Asia into your 
view? 
Tanaka: I had waited for this prospect to arise. However, at that 
time, I still hadn’t traveled overseas. While I was doing research at 
that time, I had my first chance to travel to Myanmar which was 
then known as Burma. 
Tomita: Was that with professor Watabe Tadayo?1
Tanaka: Yes. 
Tomita: You said you had waited for a chance to do research on 
agriculture in Asia and Southeast Asia. Was this an interest you fos-
tered from your student days?
Tanaka: I conducted research on cropping systems in Japan. At 
the time I thought that it was extremely important to think about 
mixed-cropping and inter-cropping systems in land use. And from 
that, I developed my interest in Asia’s different cropping systems. 
Furthermore, I also had an interest in the mutual interactions 
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among crops, how they could be improved, and how they sta-
bilized productivity. It was at this time that I engaged in research 
that led me to want to know more about the ecological structure 
of mixed crop communities.
Tomita: When I was a university student, you related that you en-
joyed reading Yanagita Kunio’s2 books when you returned home. 
Is that because you were interested in Japanese villages and the 
everyday going-ons of agriculture? 
Tanaka: This is from the days when I was in my first few year’s at 
university. At that time, the income gap between urban and rural 
areas was great. There were a great deal of problems concern-
ing the democratization and modernization of rural villages, and 
their decaying agriculture. Students who entered the Faculty of 
Agriculture were conscious that they had to do something for vil-
lages and agriculture. I wasn’t an exception.  During my first two 
years as a student, I also read books from the humanities and the 
social sciences. Young students today might not have a great in-
terest in socialism, but back in the 1960s, when we compared the 
then capitalist and socialist economies, the latter held a lot more 
appeal for me. 
Tomita: You mean ideologically?
Tanaka: Yes. I had the impression that societies free from capital-
ists, - inspite of their planned economics -, were those which were 
more progressive in terms of their distribution of wealth. When we 
were students, we underwent a Socialist and Marxist baptism. This 
was what it was like when I was an undergraduate. I graduated in 
1969, at the height of student movement across the nation. We 
were faced with not only agricultural issues, but also those related 
to environmental pollution. Many students had a great interest in 
social issues back then. 
Tomita: This was a period when people were aware of these issues 
right? Now, it is very difficult to know who is ‘friend’ from ‘foe’… 
Tanaka: It was only after the student movement that science and 
technology started to be treated with suspicion. 
Tomita: So upon your “baptism” you started to think more in re-
gards to agriculture?
Tanaka: I think one issue that caught my attention was who is 
science for? Even within the discipline of agriculture, there were 
questions and discussions about who it is for and what agricul-
tural technology should be. When I started out doing research, I 
wanted to be closer to the field so I decided to work on cropping 
systems. 
First Encounters with Southeast Asia
Tomita: You haven’t lost your raison-de-être in the importance of 
studying Southeast Asia?
Tanaka  No. After that, I continued traveling around Asia. Like 
Japan, Southeast Asia possesses an amazingly rich basis for 
agricultural production both in terms of nature and society. I still 
hold the position that their is a need to continue with agriculture 
that doesn’t waste any land, has not changed. 
Tomita: Did you think that you wanted to do something in regards 
to the lag in the modernization of farming in Southeast Asia at 
that time? Was this the impetus for you to join CSEAS?
Tanaka: No, rather I generally thought that Southeast Asia was 
a fascinating region. I first traveled to Myanmar. At this time, 
Thailand was by then a developing nation, and there was a great 
disparity between both countries. There wasn’t even a highway 
from the airport, but Bangkok became a bustling city with tourists 
from Japan and the special procurements from the Vietnam war. 
Whereas Bangkok was a city lit up by neon signs, the airport at 
Rangoon was, in comparison, a gloomy place. Even if you got a 
taxi to go into the city, everything was poorly-lit. My first impres-
sion was “wow what a place.” However, in Myanmar I traveled to 
many different agricultural areas and saw very interesting forms 
of agricultural practice. From the perspective of cropping systems, 
doing research in different parts of Southeast Asia strengthened 
my interest in the region. 
Tomita:  Did your relationship to Myanmar have anything to do 
with Watabe Tadayo’s book “the Road of Rice”(Ine no Michi)? 
Tanaka: Yes it did. We split bricks from the historical remains of a 
ruin site and analyzed rice husks inside of them. 
Tomita: This was a time when traveling overseas meant that you 
got a send off from a lot of relatives and friends at the airport. Did 
this time still apply when you traveled to Myanmar? 
Tanaka: Yes it did. Everyone in the laboratories would give you a 
send-off party. I even received gifts from professors in adjoining 
laboratories. It wasn’t so easy to travel overseas at that time, espe-
cially for young persons and students. 
Tomita: So even for Kyoto University, which has a tradition of field-
work, it was still a rarity to carry out overseas research? 
Tanaka: It was still a limited affair. Grant-in-aid research funds and 
financing for travel overseas were only instigated at the end of the 
1950s, and those who were chosen were few. We were lucky to 
receive funds from a special category and get permission to travel 
to Myanmar and do research. 
Tomita There are many agricultural researchers who went over-
seas to work in the fields of agricultural technology development 
or area development. Was this the case then?
Tanaka: During the Second World War, Japan inflicted a lot of 
damage on surrounding countries. Thus, Japan participated in the 
Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development 
in Asia and Pacific put together by the Western nations as a post 
war recovery program, and carried out overseas technological 
assistance. Yet, the Socialist nations also provided aid and tech-
nological development to the region. During the Cold War period, 
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Tanaka: The multidisciplinary approach has been the Center’s 
driving force since its inception. To understand areas, this kind 
of research approach is absolutely vital. Including the natural sci-
ences in this approach is one of the characteristics of CSEAS. For 
example, research into rice cultivation in the Malay peninsula, 
the Chao Phraya delta in Thailand, and comparative research 
into other deltas, have all included a multidisciplinary approach. 
Kyuma Kazutake,18 Takaya, Fukui, and Kaida all carried out compre-
hensive research into rice cultivation which ultimately produced 
a model. The Chao Phraya delta research was an example of this 
approach. Takaya would look at geographical features while Kaida 
would examine the hydrological environment. Fukui would be 
responsible for examining rice cultivation technology, while 
Furukawa would look at soil, Tsubouchi, society and Ishii Yoneo, 
religion. We took this comprehensive research approach towards 
the issues we examined.
Tomita: I’ve heard that for social scientists who participate in area 
studies, there is always a place for them to return to, but that 
this is not the case with natural scientists. When you came to 
CSEAS, were you resolute that you’d never go back to a Faculty of 
Agriculture? In other words, did you not hesitate? 
Tanaka: I had the strong feeling that it would be a lot more in-
teresting to wander around Southeast Asia rather than do crop 
science research in an Agricultural Faculty. And, I also thought that 
it would be difficult to return to the disciplines of agronomy and 
crop science after having done such fieldwork. I also had a con-
stant doubt: did those researchers, who were doing experimental 
work, really know agricultural places? I took pride in going out into 
the world on my own terms, enter into a dialogue with them, and 
search for a path in order to understand agriculture.  
Tomita: So at the time, did agricultural faculties focus more on ex-
periments than actual fieldwork?
Tanaka: That’s correct. In these faculties experiments have been 
the mainstream. The focus of present research is at a micro level. 
Tomita: The natural sciences are often lumped together but in 
fact, the disciplines within the field are quite different. Is this to 
the extent whereby you cannot have a dialogue? How did you 
bring together people whose terminology and backgrounds are 
different, especially when you include the humanities and social 
sciences?
Tanaka: It’s not a case of bringing them together rather “steal-
ing” from each other. I came to realize that when people come 
together to do research, they don’t just try to understand it from 
within the boundaries of their own disciplines. They have motiva-
tion to look at a region through a variety of perspectives. In the 
field, you experience a variety of things: through different disci-
plines, what do people observe, what kind of data do they search 
for, how do they prepare it, and what kind of words do they use to 
explain it? This in itself is study. In that sense, you “steal concepts” 
and “tools” from those around you…
Tomita: Did your resolve to create a new field after meeting all 
the area that Japan could most readily cooperate in was the in-
troduction of agricultural technology, especially rice technology 
to Southeast Asia. Under the auspices of the Colombo plan, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and universities were able to send research-
ers overseas. At that time, as part of a war reparations program, 
the Japanese Ministry of Education initiated a program to accept 
overseas students to Japan. Kyoto University accepted its fair 
share of students from Southeast Asia. More than a few came to 
the Faculty of Agriculture, and this was the beginning of relations 
between the Faculty of Agriculture and Southeast Asian universi-
ties. Many of the foreign students returned to their countries as 
teachers and it was through them that we were able to do over-
seas and joint research projects. Kasetsart University in Thailand 
and Bogor Agricultural University in Indonesia were places where 
we fostered relations. 
Tomita: And this formula hasn’t changed to date right?
Tanaka: We now have 2nd and 3rd generation researchers going 
overseas. 
Multidisciplinary Research in CSEAS:  
Eating from the Same Bowl
Tomita: When you transferred to CSEAS in 1979, you first did re-
search in a frontier village in South Sulawesi. How did you come 
about doing research there?
Tanaka: Before Prof. Watabe was invited to be the director of 
CSEAS, I was an assistant professor at his laboratory. I followed him 
to the Center a year later in 1979. At this time I was still involved 
in the project in Myanmar and traveled there and in India with 
Prof. Watabe in the same year. After that, between 1979-80, there 
was talk about the need to carry out a large collaborative research 
project. 
Tomita: And this was aiming at a joint multidisciplinary project?
Tanaka: That’s right. One part of this was the Don Daeng 
Research Project3 which Profs. Ishii Yoneo4, Fukui Hayao5 and 
Kaida Yoshihiro6 pushed forward. They aimed to use Prof. Mizuno 
Koichi’s7 research in Don Daeng as a base to look at 20 years later. 
This is where the project to do intensive research in the village 
began in the Northeast of Thailand. Profs. Kuchiba Masuo8 and 
Funahashi Kazuo,9 from Ryukoku University, also participated in 
the project. At the time, they managed to start one project on 
the mainland, and subsequently started another one in an in-
sular area. Tachimoto Narifumi10 did research in Sulawesi, while 
Tsubouchi Yoshihiro11 did research in South Sumatra. Profs. Takaya 
Yoshikazu12 and Furukawa Hisao13 also formed teams to do re-
search in Sulawesi. Both myself and Kato Tsuyoshi14 formed part of 
that team. This was my first time to travel to Sulawesi. Those who 
were in the mainland team were Kono Yasuyuki,15 Hayashi Yukio,16 
and Miyagawa Shuichi.17
Tomita: What kind of awareness of issues led to a desire to carry 
out comprehensive research in a multidisciplinary fashion?
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those around you?
Tanaka: Not something as audacious as that, but to enjoy 
Southeast Asian studies with other people. In other words, to be 
together with like minded people. 
Tomita: When I was a graduate student, there were intense dis-
cussions at CSEAS about multidisciplinary research. My impression 
from that time, was that this kind of research would continue to 
develop. However, looking over the present state of the field, it 
seems that disciplines have become more compartmentalized 
rather than more collaborative. Why do you think that the multi-
disciplinary environment you tried to foster — the methods and 
experiences of doing joint research between disciplines — has 
not been inherited?
Tanaka: The approach of the research groups working in Don 
Daeng and Sulawesi were totally different. With the group in 
Sulawesi, the researchers didn’t focus on one particular location or 
community but looked far and wide. By doing so, you can paint a 
fuller picture of the area. That was the conceptual framework that 
we thought up. It was there that we came up with the terms ‘mari-
time world’ and ‘frontier world.’ If we had any kind of responsibility, 
it was to pass on this approach and research methods to create 
a larger picture for the next generation, something we didn’t do. 
What we did was enjoyable, yet we didn’t create researchers who 
could inherit this. This is something we must really think over.
Tomita: However, you managed to further develop the organiza-
tion of area studies. And, you were able to create a category in the 
Japanese grant-in-aid research funds for other researchers to do 
area studies. 
Tanaka: The reason why we were able to disseminate the term 
area studies, was that Southeast Asian studies had played a pio-
neering role. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science 
and Technology (MEXT) had organized Scientific Research on 
Priority Areas and in 1993 the Center for Southeast Asian Studies 
was central in putting forward Global Area Studies. Between 1993 
to 1996 we initiated a large-scale project “Toward an Integrated 
Approach to Area Studies: In Search of a Paradigm for a Harmonized 
Relationship between the World and Its Areas.” However, this proj-
ect wasn’t just made up of Southeast Asian Studies, but also South 
Asian Studies, European Studies, and other researchers working in 
other world regions. Through the framework of Area Studies we 
were able to launch many different research themes and move 
forward with projects. At that time, this led to very interesting pro-
grams. And, it was at this time that Kyoto University Press released 
its Kyoto Area Studies Series. From that time, if a political scien-
tist was doing research on politics in a particular region, he could 
publish as an area studies researcher. An atmosphere arose where 
no one would complain if they were such a type of researcher.  
 Within the fields of the social sciences and humanities we 
have gathered together quite a few researchers who are looking 
into world cultures, religions, societies, politics, and economies. 
These researchers have been active in forming connections 
not just in disciplines and academic societies, but also in re-
gions. This has even led to the organization of societies which 
take the name of their study regions. For example, until now we 
have been known for research in Southeast Asia, but there has 
been a move for us to be called Southeast Asian Studies.  
 To date, researchers focusing on areas have discussed them 
within their own disciplines. Through creating area studies, we 
expected that new scholarship and discoveries would emerge. 
Thus, we shone a light on area studies, through a meta level un-
derstanding of them, and through new fusions we expected to 
push forward this understanding.  
Tomita: However, the actual situation is that within Southeast 
Asian Studies we have Lao, Thai, and Vietnamese Studies all sepa-
rated by country. I think that the integratedness that area studies 
was aiming for, is not there. Furthermore, I feel that students in 
area studies programs from different disciplines don’t really com-
municate with each other. 
Tanaka: One reason for that is that students are in a very com-
petitive environment, and are under pressure to produce research 
results. If you set agendas where graduate students have to make 
the most of previous studies within their discipline, clarify hitherto 
unclarified areas of research, and carry out analysis, this inevitably 
leads to the compartmentalization of research agendas. Students 
have to receive their diplomas and graduate. Area studies had to 
bear the responsibility of educating. This means that you cannot 
form groups and meander out into the field. We can no longer go 
out for months at a time, and do fieldwork as we did in the past. 
We were able to go and do research between July and October 
as we didn’t have students and for this reason, we were even ex-
cused from faculty meetings. We never felt that we were under 
time constraints.
Tomita: Traveling out into the field together is crucial in pushing 
forward interdisciplinary research. 
Tanaka: That’s right. “Eating from the same bowl” is the most im-
portant thing. 
Tomita: Will an organization that does area studies, such as 
CSEAS, be playing a more pivotal role as a hub to bring together 
researchers?
Tanaka: The most important role is to be able to deliver an environ-
ment where collaborative research can take place. Collaborative 
research, by area studies specialists who are trained in their disci-
plines, is important. For that reason, researchers need more time…
Integrated Agronomy as a Base for Area Studies
Tomita: Previously, I think you mentioned that agronomy was 
more interesting than area studies. In what sense did you mean 
that?
Tanaka: What I said about agronomy might be misleading. What I 
meant was that its integratedness has a certain appeal. Agriculture 
is important for you can study it wherever you go. In that sense, I 
find the sense of agronomy very interesting. I may sometimes say 
that an integrated way of thinking in agronomy is a base for area 
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studies. In this sense, to do area studies you do need some kind 
of disciplinary base. In my case, it was agronomy. Furthermore, I 
have practiced areas studies and Southeast Asian studies. This is 
the same as someone who has trained in sociology doing area 
studies. However, I’ve maintained the sense that I am not doing 
area studies for the sake of agronomy. I’ve practiced area studies. 
Tomita: Finally, what plans do you have for future research. 
Tanaka: I want to look into a Japanese agricultural history that 
includes an overseas perspective. That is, the relation between 
Japanese agricultural techniques and East Asia and Southeast 
Asia’s agriculture. As I mentioned earlier about the Colombo 
Plan, there were linkages after WWII and even pre-war in then 
Manchuria, the Korean peninsula, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia. I will 
look at Japan’s agricultural history from the early modern period 
to present day and its relations overseas.  
Tomita: Looking at present day Japan’s agriculture through a his-
torical lens, we presently see that farmers are rapidly decreasing 
and that mountain areas are typified by the elderly. We are facing 
a difficult problem as to how we can resuscitate the agricultural 
industry.
Tanaka: On this issue, I am optimistic. It’s often said that the in-
troduction of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Partnership Agreement 
(TPP) will lead to the destruction of Japanese agriculture, but I do 
not think this is the case. You might not see paddy fields within 
Kyoto city, but just step out to the surrounding areas close by, and 
you are greeted by many. Do you really think that by neglecting 
them they’ll become barren? I’m not a proponent of TPP, but can 
you really imagine that with its entry, our agricultural industry will 
collapse, that our paddy fields will become overgrown by weeds?
Tomita: However, isn’t it the case that the villages that have prac-
ticed forestry in mountainous areas have become quite desolate ? 
Landslides have also become an issue as well as empty houses, 
and there are many places where there are more wild animals 
than people. I just wonder who will migrate to these places…
Tanaka: …And these places might completely disappear. There 
are villages that have been deserted, but there are other places 
with lots of people still living in them. I don’t believe that all these 
fields will become overgrown. There is a call for the liberalization 
of trade and this will lead to a swing in opinion. They’ll be people 
who have to continue in the agricultural industry as well as new 
motivated actors and they’ll inevitably introduce a new equilib-
rium. We might even see an increase in foreigners. There might 
be people in urban areas who lose the mean’s to make their liveli-
hood; people who might or might not want to make a fast buck. 
So, in that sense, I really don’t think that Japan’s agricultural future 
is so bleak. 
Tomita: Thank you very much for your time. 
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Inequality in Thailand and Japan
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Until recently most academics, politicians, and policy-makers in Thailand paid little attention to inequality, but the recent 
political conflict has changed that. In a brilliant touch of political 
satire, the Red Shirt demonstrators called themselves phrai, serfs, 
and their opponents ammat, lords. This vocabulary expressed a 
sense of deep resentment; one Red Shirt protestor explained, 
“What we mean by democracy is fairness. We want fairness in 
three ways: legal, political, and educational” (Sopranzetti  2001, 
12).1 It also signaled a decline in deference, and that made peo-
ple take notice.
Economic inequality does not automatically lead to politi-
cal conflict. Indeed reducing income inequality does not figure 
among the demands of the Red Shirt protesters. But economic 
inequality tends to underlie and reinforce other forms of in-
equality, such as differential access to politics, education, other 
public goods, and also cultural attitudes of hierarchy. The recent 
Thai protests have been about these issues. 
For the last three years, I have been working with a dozen re-
searchers on a project about inequality. The figures are striking.
Over one generation from the 1970s to 2000s, average real 
per capita income in Thailand tripled. But at the same time, the 
society became much more unequal. Chart 1 shows inequality 
in household income as measured by the Gini Index (a higher 
figure means greater inequality).2 Look at the left-hand part of 
the chart, up to the dotted line at 1992. In Thailand, inequality 
worsened across the whole period of “development,” and espe-
cially in the boom which began in the mid-1980s. By contrast, 
the trends of income distribution in neighboring countries of 
Southeast Asia were all going in the opposite direction. This is 
perplexing. These countries are rather similar in many ways, and 
were all pursuing similar economic strategies. Why was Thailand 
so different in this respect?
Eric Kuhonta has recently published a book comparing the 
trends of inequality in Thailand and Malaysia (Kuhonta 2011).3 
He argues that the difference can be explained through poli-
tics. In Malaysia, United Malays National Organization (UMNO) 
emerged as a strong party, and had a commitment to mitigate 
social tension after the ethnic riots of 1969. By contrast, Thai par-
ties have been weak and elite-dominated.
I think Kuhonta’s thesis is interesting, but the subject is more 
complex than can be captured in a single argument. Thailand 
achieved high economic growth by becoming a part of global 
manufacturing chains, but then concentrated on keeping 
wages low to remain competitive on the low rungs of these 
chains rather than developing better skills and capabilities to 
move up the ladder within them. Wages lagged behind the 
growth of productivity and of GDP.
In addition, multinational firms tended to use capital- 
intensive techniques which generated little employment, so 
two-thirds of the workforce was left in agriculture or the informal 
sector where productivity and incomes were low. The provision 
of education was limited so the few who benefited were able 
to command rising incomes. Although some workers improved 
their income by moving from agriculture to manufacturing, the 
numbers were not large enough to offset the concentration of 
income in the pockets of capital owners and a new middle class 
with high education. 
Bangkok became a super-primate city, a unique con-
centration of wealth and power, closely integrated into the 
globalized world economy. The gap in income and opportunity 
between Bangkok and everywhere else grew wider and wider. 
Government’s spending on public goods such as infrastructure, 
education, and social security was very low and very concen-
trated in Bangkok. Hence these goods were rather scarce and 
a few had much better access to them than the many. This was 
another source of inequality.
Governments have never had serious policies to counter 
inequality. The tax system probably contributes to inequality 
because it relies heavily on indirect taxes (like VAT) which weigh 
more on the poor than the rich, and because direct taxes (on 
personal income and business profits) are widely evaded by the 
powerful. Several efforts at land reform have failed.
Economic crises may have contributed too. In the 1997–98 
financial crises, many businesses were technically bankrupt.  A 
few who still had access to cash were able to buy up corporate 
assets and land at fire-sale prices. There may have been a similar 
trend in other crises. 
As the right-hand part of Chart 1 shows, Thailand’s income 
inequality has improved a bit since the early 1990s. At least four 
factors have probably contributed. First, in the final stages of the 
pre-1997 boom, and again in the last few years, the labor market 
has been tight, allowing real wages to rise.  Second, the Thaksin 
government’s policies, especially the universal health scheme 
and microcredit provision, had a direct impact on lower-rung 
incomes. Third, governments have gradually increased farm-
price subsidies. Fourth, government has begun to disperse 
industry outside the capital and devolve power and budget to 
local government bodies. This has begun to reduce the huge 
gap between the capital and the provincial areas. But the trend 
of reducing inequality is still tentative, and Thailand is still more 
unequal than its neighbors.
Inequality in wealth is even starker. Since 2006, there has 
been data on the household ownership of wealth (land and 
housing, gold, financial assets, major durables). Chart 2 shows 
the result of the first three surveys. Wealth is very, very concen-
trated at the top. The gap between the top 10 percent and the 
bottom 10 percent is almost 300 times. The gap between the 
top 10 percent and the second 10 percent is also very wide. And 
these data almost certainly underestimate the real picture be-
cause the rich are more likely to conceal their true wealth. The 
distribution of land and financial assets is especially skewed.
In international league tables of equality, Japan usually 
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Inequality in Thailand and Japan
comes in the top ranks, along with Scandinavian countries, 
while Thailand languishes near the bottom, just above many 
African and Latin American countries. I was thus fascinated 
when I saw Chart 3.4 The blue bars show “market income,” which 
means income before tax and transfers such as social security 
payments. Since around 1980, inequality in market income has 
risen steeply. Indeed, in the last few years it has become even 
worse than Thailand.5
What caused this major change over two decades? Studies 
by Ohtake Fumio6 and Randall Jones for OECD7 identify two 
main causes, though differ a little on the weightage between 
them (Randall 2007). First, as the society ages, there are more 
people living on pensions and fewer in employment, so this 
alone causes inequality to rise. In addition, there is very high in-
equality within the cohort of retirees. Second, with the collapse 
of the lifetime employment system, the numbers in casual em-
ployment have soared, reaching an astonishing 34 percent of all 
the employed in 2010. Less than a third of them work part-time 
by choice. The young, aged, and women have especially high 
rates of involuntary casualization.
But there is another part of the Japan story. On Chart 3, the 
pink bars show inequality after tax and transfers. This has wors-
ened a bit, but not by much. Japan still ranks among the most 
equal countries. This is an extraordinary achievement. How was 
it done?
The black line at the bottom shows the contribution from 
progressive taxation. This was important in the early years, but 
has declined due to reductions in the top tax rate since the 
mid-1980s. The red line shows the contribution from transfers, 
mainly pensions and other social security payments. These have 
grown rapidly and are the main factor keeping the distribution 
relatively equal by international standards.
So far, so good. But how long can this be sustained? The im-
pact of ageing on inequality will continue to worsen. So too 
probably will the trend of casualization. The strain of these trans-
fer payments on the (highly indebted) Japanese government 
is already high. The young are starting to question the system 
since they benefit little now, and may never benefit because the 
financing is unsustainable.
Still, what is truly striking from an international perspective 
is the success of the state in maintaining relatively low inequal-
ity to date, and the general support from society for this effort. 
Equality is a deep-seated value of Japanese society.
That is not true of Thailand. Like the US, it has a high pro-
portion of one-time immigrants, and a frontier-style economy 
in the recent past. There is a strong ethos of the self-made man, 
and little support for the idea that people ought to be equal. 
My research team has to be careful about its recommenda-
tions for policies to mitigate Thailand’s inequality. For example, 
if we suggest increasing direct transfers and making tax more 
progressive, we will probably face opposition. Instead we will 
recommend higher spending on public goods, which will be 
more acceptable. But we will also suggest introducing taxes on 
wealth to pay for the higher spending, and that might evoke 
some interesting reactions.
Many thanks to Professor Kaoru Sugihara for hosting my stay 
at CSEAS and helping me to understand the Japanese situation, 
and some aspects of Thailand.
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Myanmar’s ASEAN Chairmanship in 2014:
Legitimacy, Salvation and Interests
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Associate Professor CSEAS
damage the reputation of ASEAN. 2014 will be a crucial year for 
both Myanmar and ASEAN. For Myanmar, the second general elec-
tion since 1990 will be just a year away (in 2015).1 Serving as ASEAN 
chair will render much needed political legitimacy to the regime 
in Naypyidaw. The government will be responsible for organizing 
hundred of ASEAN meetings during the period of its chairmanship. 
This will further expose Myanmar to the regional community, bring 
in more investments from ASEAN countries and their dialogue 
partners, and at the same time allow the government to exercise 
its leadership by working closely with ASEAN members to reaffirm 
their obligations toward community building in 2015. Therefore, an 
ASEAN chairmanship could become a fundamental factor that can 
potentially shape Myanmar’s internal politics in favour of the ruling 
elite and to a certain extent influence election results. As for ASEAN, 
offering Myanmar the chairmanship seems inevitable, although 
it is a risky gamble. Its decision could be explained in the context 
of ASEAN yearning to be vindicated of its past policy of engaging 
with Myanmar, rather than isolating it, which was often criticized 
by  Western governments for being too soft, powerless and indeed 
tolerant of the repressive behavior of the Myanmar junta. Factually, 
Myanmar has to date remained the only member which has never 
served as a chair of ASEAN. In approving Myanmar’s quest for chair-
manship, ASEAN, once again, piggybacks and thus legitimizes the 
Myanmar regime, just as it did in 1997 when Myanmar was admit-
ted into the family of ASEAN despite protests from the international 
community.
From 2004, Myanmar embarked on its roadmap toward democ-
ratization. Although at the beginning the reforms were slow, but 
in 2010, Myanmar showed the world that it had finally fulfilled all 
the steps toward their version of democratization when it spon-
sored a general election, which would be held for the first time 
in 20 years. At first, the election was heavily reproached as being 
bogus and a process designed to legitimise the political position of 
the old junta. However, from 2010 onwards, to everyone’s surprise, 
Myanmar witnessed rapid political developments, from the release 
of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, the return to the legal fold 
for her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), and even-
tually, to her own political homecoming. Parallel to these positive 
developments has been the persistent campaign launched by the 
new government in Naypyidaw to bid for ASEAN’s chairmanship 
in 2014. Such a campaign was widely considered as a recognized 
bid to accord the government a sense of legitimacy. For ASEAN, 
the progressive political reforms in Myanmar came to rescue the or-
ganization’s failed Myanmar policy. Thus, granting chairmanship to 
Myanmar was justified. But even as ASEAN was feeling satisfaction 
with the rapid political progress in Myanmar, some Western nations 
remained sceptical about the ongoing reforms in this country. In 
particular, major non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were still 
not convinced if the reforms in Myanmar were real. They are of the 
impression that Myanmar has not met international standards on 
political conduct. So, the Myanmar chairmanship of ASEAN in 2014 
Myanmar has been granted the chairmanship of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for 2014, eight years after 
it voluntarily gave up its turn to chair the group. Despite the latest 
political developments in Myanmar, critics continue to doubt if its 
reforms are real, or just cosmetic. Such doubts are also cast upon 
Myanmar’s role as ASEAN chair. This essay seeks to engage two 
key arguments. First, Myanmar needs the ASEAN chairmanship to 
supplement its ongoing democratization, a part of the new regime 
searching for a fresh source of legitimacy by reaching out to neigh-
bors in the Southeast Asian region. More importantly, it is hoping 
that the progressive reforms might ultimately influence the West 
to abolish decades-old sanctions which have severely hurt the fi-
nancial status of Myanmar’s top leaders. But one crucial question 
remains: will this be translated into the likelihood that Myanmar 
will behave according to regional norms in the future? Second, on 
ASEAN’s part, awarding Myanmar the regional chairmanship is es-
sentially strategic because it will vindicate ASEAN’s past Myanmar 
policy which was centred predominantly on engagement and not 
punishment. Yet, how Myanmar will fulfil ASEAN’s obligations to-
ward community building remains an unanswered conundrum. It 
appears that the much anticipated Myanmar chairmanship is pri-
marily designed to legitimise Myanmar rather than to promote a 
true sense of regionalism which now depends on the materializa-
tion of community building by the year 2015.  
A Decade of Transformation
At the 19th ASEAN Summit in Indonesia’s Bali, leaders of ASEAN 
announced that they had unanimously agreed to give Myanmar 
the chairmanship of the regional bloc for 2014. Myanmar was origi-
nally scheduled to chair the rotational chairmanship of ASEAN in 
2016, but had requested to host the ASEAN Summit two years 
earlier after being pressured to relinquish its chairmanship for 
2006. This was due to its repressive military regime continuing to 
Downtown Yangon with the golden Shewdagon Pagoda as a backdrop
14
is untimely, and will even obstruct the grouping’s plan to complete 
its community building in 2015.
A variety of Responses 
So far, the West has adopted an ambivalent attitude. Positively, 
a number of Western governments have already welcomed 
Myanmar’s in-progress political reforms and its civilianization pro-
cess. And indeed, political changes in Myanmar have generated 
an impact on the policies of some Western and Asian govern-
ment toward the Myanmar regime. For example, the E.U. Foreign 
Ministers met on 23 April 2012 to review its Common Position on 
Myanmar and as a result lifted some sanctions, particularly the 
visa bans against Myanmar officials traveling to Europe. Similarly, 
the Obama administration has been reviewing the complicated 
layers of U.S. sanctions, looking for those that can be lifted by the 
executive branch in lieu of a major Congressional decision to lift 
legislative sanctions. In March 2012, the U.S. State Department lifted 
travel restrictions on Myanmar diplomats assigned to the United 
Nations, which had prohibited them from travelling more than 25 
miles outside of New York. Shortly after that, the Congressional 
Research Service released a report that was fairly bullish in stating 
that the administration would lift some sanctions after the 1 April 
by-elections in Myanmar. In Asia, Japan has approached a water-
shed in its policy toward Myanmar. The Foreign and Trade Ministries 
planned to launch a major economic surge but were held back 
by the fact that Myanmar owes Japan US$6 billion from previous 
loans. They are currently considering working with the international 
financial institutions to arrange bridging loans and other mecha-
nisms to get around this. Recently, the Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation sent a delegation to Myanmar to see if there would 
be any other potential financial schemes they could work closely 
together on. However, despite optimism, scepticism has remained. 
The continued human rights abuses in Myanmar, and the fact that 
a large number of political prisoners have not been released even 
when the political situation has improved, are responsible for the 
ambivalent attitude of some Western governments. Moreover, drug 
trafficking and refugees emanating from Myanmar still pose as an 
imminent threat to its neighbors. This attitude is the main reason 
why international sanctions have not been totally abolished. 
Meanwhile, reaction from some ethnic groups has been largely 
disapproving. Representatives of ethnic groups argued that ASEAN 
granted its chairmanship to Myanmar too soon instead of delaying 
its decision until key changes were made.2 In other words, ASEAN’s 
move to celebrate Myanmar’s political transition by granting its 
chairmanship was immature and could be counterproductive as 
the political elite could change their mind in the future if they feel 
that democratization would further shrink their political authority. 
Earlier, there was a call for the Myanmar government to meet three 
important benchmarks before an ASEAN chairmanship was to be 
granted to Myanmar: first, immediate and unconditional release of 
all political prisoners; second, a declaration of a nationwide cease-
fire with ethnic armed groups and cessation of attacks on ethnic 
communities; and third, inclusive political dialogue with ethnic 
nationality representatives, including armed groups, and the pro-
democracy movement, led by Suu Kyi and the NLD.
Legitimacy for Naypyidaw
Playing host to an ASEAN Summit in such a crucial year is part 
of an attempt by the Myanmar regime to have its legitimacy recog-
nized not only by its ASEAN neighbors but also by the international 
community. Legitimacy has become immensely fundamental 
for the lifting of sanctions. And the quickest route to earn that le-
gitimacy from the international community is to exploit ASEAN 
platform to recreate Myanmar’s new persona as an emerging 
democratic state in the region which deserves to be supported, en-
dorsed and legitimized. It is rather complicated to understand why 
the Myanmar junta finally agreed to step down to pave the way for 
a progressive faction to transform Myanmar into a more civilian-
ized state. There are a number of reasons behind the unexpected 
political changes. First, prior to the election of 2010, pressure within 
the country had built up to such a degree that the ancien régime of 
Myanmar was forced to look for a way to open up the country if the 
political elite were to survive. At the same time, the regional and 
international environments have changed tremendously. Almost all 
ASEAN members have been concentrating more on accelerating 
their economic growth and building the region as a community. 
This has taken place alongside changes within Myanmar’s domes-
tic realm. The new generation in the army—tatmadaw—is less 
conservative. Besides, democratization has restrained the military’s 
traditional role in defining domestic political order as well as con-
ducting foreign relations. It was likely that there was an agreement 
among the elite on the need to transform Myanmar before it was 
too late and they were left totally powerless. Hence, the political 
reforms have begun. For the Myanmar leadership, opening up the 
country economically was an initial step which was constructive 
and essentially strategic. It allowed political leaders to cling on to 
political power while promoting liberal economic policy to justify 
its ongoing reform process.
The reform was a big gamble. To ensure that the political elite 
would not be losers in the new game of politics, they sought to 
have the new regime legitimized by the international community—
the regime that was envisaged by the elite of the past generation. 
To expedite this legitimizing process, the Myanmar leadership em-
barked on several “brave” moves, such as releasing Suu Kyi, relaxing 
draconian controls over the media, legalizing trade union, and the 
invitation to the NLD to return to the political domain.4 The ASEAN 
chairmanship was therefore needed so that Myanmar would be 
able to fulfil this important agenda of its own. In the meantime, 
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Myanmar has actively readjusted its diplomatic tactic. Not only 
has it targeted at being involved in the ASEAN community, but 
also reaching out to powers outside the region. From the visit to 
Myanmar of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in December 2011, 
to those of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and British Prime 
Minister David Cameron in April 2012, Myanmar sent out a strong 
message that it wanted to engage the world and behave “nor-
mally” so that it would be recognized as a responsible member of 
world society. The new diplomacy, from isolation to engagement, 
was meant to earn legitimacy on the part of the new government 
under President Thein Sein. 
From this viewpoint, serving as ASEAN chair will further solidify 
Myanmar’s current position both in the region and in the world. 
ASEAN has its own dialogue partners system and many coopera-
tive frameworks that bring together all members to work closely 
on a variety of issues. The position as a chair of ASEAN will provide 
Myanmar an excellent opportunity to cooperate with non-ASEAN 
partners, with whom Myanmar has been yearning for rapproche-
ment in exchange for gaining their support and recognition. In 
other words, an ASEAN chair will be complementary to Myanmar’s 
national efforts to engage with foreign powers for ultimately a nor-
malization of diplomatic relations. This legitimacy is, for the Myanmar 
regime, a prerequisite to the lifting of sanctions. And without sanc-
tions, more direct contacts between the Myanmar economy and 
foreign investors will be made possible at a national level. As a 
result, the economic livelihood of Myanmar will improve, allow-
ing the regime to earn even more legitimacy. Most importantly, a 
sanctions-free Myanmar would benefit old generals who may 
have left the political scene but are still in control of big businesses 
in Myanmar. This explains why they were willing to jeopardise 
their power position through the support for the country’s 
democratization.
Salvation for ASEAN
The next question is why ASEAN went along with Myanmar’s 
ambition to host the Summit two years before its rotational 
chairmanship. ASEAN has consistently been reproached for its 
flawed Myanmar policy, since the day it offered membership to 
the junta—a decision that was irreversible. Through the years, 
Myanmar has never behaved accordingly to the expectation of its 
ASEAN fellows. Instead, it continued to test the limits of ASEAN and 
often put the reputation of ASEAN at risk. In the meantime, certain 
norms practiced in ASEAN acted as a great barrier in influencing 
the Myanmar regime. On the one hand, ASEAN has rigidly practiced 
the principle of non-interference and thus was not in a position of 
lecturing the Myanmar junta. On the other hand, the decision by 
the organization to not offer Myanmar membership in 1997 was 
a mistake. Owing to this dark paradox, ASEAN was hand-cuffed by 
its own policy: as much as by its own rules and regulations. As a 
consequence, the only time ASEAN spoke in one voice was when 
it constructed a policy of constructive engagement in dealing with 
Myanmar issues. Briefly put, this policy preferred dialogue rather 
than sanctions. This was criticized by friends of ASEAN as ineffec-
tive as the policy unveiled the organization’s weakness in managing 
Myanmar. Myanmar has thus long become a stigma for ASEAN. And 
because of this inherent weakness of ASEAN, its efforts to engage 
with Myanmar were actually taken for granted by the Myanmar 
leaders themselves. The need for ASEAN members to compete 
with other regional powers in order to gain a foothold in resource-
rich Myanmar represented another reason why a soft approach 
was preferred by ASEAN as it handled Myanmar issues. With this 
stigma, ASEAN was waiting for the right moment in which it could 
justify its past policy, and eventually reaffirm that the ASEAN way, in 
which constructive engagement was adopted instead of pressure 
and sanctions, was the right approach from the beginning. And fi-
nally, that right moment  arrived with the request of Myanmar to 
serve as the chair in 2014. The decision was made in 2011 during 
which Indonesia was the chair. Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty 
Natalegawa spoke on 19 September 2011 about whether to invite 
Myanmar to chair ASEAN in 2014 by saying, “I shall be keen to listen 
and to hear the voice of civil society, not least the voice of Daw 
Aung San Suu Kyi. We welcome this invitation and take the op-
portunity we have been offered to present our views on whether 
Myanmar should chair ASEAN in 2014.” 5 Indonesia’s solid backing of 
Myanmar’s request was part of Jakarta’s implementing a new diplo-
matic activism of its own. 
As stressed earlier, the only time ASEAN was successful in pro-
ducing a united stance vis-à-vis Myanmar was when it formulated 
the constructive engagement policy. But for most of the time, it 
was evident that ASEAN was not in a place where it could find a 
common position to deal with several problems in Myanmar, from 
the repeated house arrests of Suu Kyi, the continued detention 
of political prisoners, to the crackdown of street protestors in the 
so-called “Saffron Revolution” in 2007. ASEAN’s approach has been 
“responsive” and “reactive,” rather than leading any initiatives—this 
starkly contradicted its ambition of being a driving force of the 
region. Now that Myanmar has flirted with democratization with 
tangible outcomes being seen since the election in 2010, ASEAN 
immediately saw the changes as part of its own success of “acclima-
tizing” Myanmar to fit in with developments in the region. ASEAN 
was quick to celebrate the ongoing political reforms in Myanmar. 
And when Suu Kyi was released one week after the election, several 
state-sponsored media organizations within ASEAN claimed that 
the endpoint of authoritarianism in Myanmar had arrived. From 
this perspective, rewarding Myanmar for its effort to democratize 
was legitimate. On top of this, ASEAN itself also demanded recogni-
tion from the international community for its endeavour to engage 
with Myanmar—this was a part of ASEAN claiming to be a serious 
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organization which supported democracy and political dialogue. 
The vindication of ASEAN’s past policy was indeed behind the offer 
of the ASEAN chairmanship for Myanmar. Singapore’s Straits Times 
wrote, “ASEAN was right on the money when it called on the West 
to lift the sanctions on Myanmar,” in response to the democratic 
progress in Myanmar in 2011.6 Meanwhile, Surin Pitsuwan, ASEAN 
Secretary-General, lent his support to the Myanmar chairmanship 
when he declared, “Myanmar’s chair in 2014 will be a critical land-
mark in the history of ASEAN.”7
For Whose Interests?
As this essay argues, the real missions of both Myanmar and 
ASEAN behind the chairmanship issue were indeed more about a 
self-fulfilment rather that anything meaningful to the development 
of regionalism. The objectives of Myanmar were clear—to gain le-
gitimacy as a prerequisite to the lifting of sanction. For ASEAN, the 
only goal was to seek vindication of its past Myanmar policy even 
when it may know that the Myanmar chairmanship may not con-
tribute positively to community building in 2015. In an interview 
with a Singaporean diplomat, he said, “We must assure that ASEAN 
will not make the second mistake—the first was to admit Myanmar, 
now we have to make ASEAN chairmanship of Myanmar work.”8 
Naypyidaw has not elaborated its vision of how to help enhance 
the effectiveness of ASEAN and further promote regionalization. 
Meanwhile, ASEAN has paid too much attention to, and possibly 
became too excited about, the unexpected changes in Myanmar 
that it rushed to grant its chairmanship to Myanmar without seri-
ously calculating the impact of the community building process. 
Having Myanmar as a chair would challenge ASEAN’s effort to recre-
ate its image as a serious organization. There will be many questions 
which will remain unanswered. These could include: how will 
Myanmar handle its human rights situation and at the same time 
preside over the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights (AICHR)? What if the chair continues to violate human rights 
and obstruct the works of the AICHR? When will Myanmar re-
lease all political prisoners? And is Myanmar ready to reconstruct 
its economy so that it could rejoin the world’s economy? Difficult 
questions will also be asked in terms of how ASEAN will response 
to a possible failing chairmanship on the part of Myanmar. What 
are measures to be put in place in case Myanmar backtracks on its 
political reforms while serving as an ASEAN chair? Will ASEAN be 
brave to revoke Myanmar’s chairmanship should political violence 
occur in Myanmar?
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Termites’ Merciless Acts of Respect
toward their Sick and Dead Nestmates
Kok-Boon Neoh
Researcher CSEAS
Termites are excellent forest keepers. They clear fallen trees and other cellulose-base materials, and recycle them back 
to nature. In addition, there is increasing evidence that points to 
the substantial positive influence of termites on soil quality by 
enhancing soil nutrient composition and increasing soil poros-
ity. This in turn, increases crop yields to meet increasing food 
demand. Today, their roles in supporting human civilization and 
governing ecosystem functions are undisputedly recognized by 
ecologists despite their notoreity as pests in human settings. 
Termites are commonly seen as vulnerable and fragile in-
sects. Due to a thin skin (poorly sclerotized cuticle), they look 
whitish in color and run a high risk of desiccation. Nonetheless, 
they are ubiquitous inhabitants of many rangeland ecosystems 
throughout the world, but absent from areas covered by ice. The 
establishment of the very first termite colonies has been dated 
back to about 250 million years, far beyond our human history 
on earth and they reside back in a period when dinosaurs were 
still present. Over time, and to a certain extent, termites must 
have developed their own adaptive survival strategies to strive 
through harsh environments and successfully sustain the colo-
nies they have today. 
Bugs like ants, bees, and wasps use many sophisticated be-
haviors when they encounter sick nestmates in their nest to 
prevent the spread of diseases that may be unfavorable to a col-
ony. Dead body removal is one of the most common responses 
exhibited by ants and bees that inhabit large and enclosed 
nests. In the case of ant’s, such behavior was first described in 
the 1950’s, in which dead ants were picked up and carried away 
from the nest toward refuse piles by worker ants.
Termites can built their nest as conspicuous mounds to cryp-
tic underground colonies or even within a single small piece of 
wood. Furthermore, a small proportion of termites are respon-
sible for creating the maze of chopstick-width tubes in the mud 
during food searching, and most of them spend a great deal of 
their time in a confined nest for young and reproductive car-
ing. Under controlled temperature and humidity, a diverse and 
potentially pathogenic microbial community may reside within 
the nest. This definitely poses a considerable disease threat to 
termite members. The question on how termites cope with sick 
termites has always fascinated biologists as well as the educated 
layman for decades and is the focus of this essay.
Decade-long mutual and adaptive termite battles
As a rule, termites have significantly developed an adapta-
tion to social life in enclosed nests: some termite species can 
be as cruel as to cannibalize their own nestmates; sometimes 
however termites can be slightly more “respectful” of their dead.
Firstly, sick termites usually show a series of alarming re-
sponses, such as head banging on surfaces in an effort to 
produce vibrations after coming into contact with potentially 
Termites that nest within their food consumed their dead nestmates. 
This creates more open spaces in their limited living/feeding area.
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Fig. 1: Queen termite is intensively groomed by worker termites
life-threatening pathogens (Rosengaus et al. 1998). This appears 
to convey information about the presence of pathogen-
exposed termites to nearby nestmates to stay away from the 
source. Nevertheless, in most instances, escape is just a tempo-
rary measure and not the best solution for a highly social and 
population-concentrated species in a confined environment.
Termites engage in complex behaviors to get rid of their sick 
and dead nestmates. Of course, the behavior shown is not con-
sistent among termites but is actually species specific.
Recent research demonstrated that after evacuation, ter-
mites returned to their sick to check their fitness and groom 
them frequently in an effort to differentiate the degree of decay 
among the dead and the level of threat they pose to the col-
ony (Neoh et al. 2012). For example, how many dead are there? 
Are any individuals still alive? Do they pose a threat to the col-
ony? Through this kind of action, the sick termites benefitted 
through social contact (i.e., grooming) with healthy nestmates: 
their recovery rates were drastically increased as the grooming 
physically removed pathogens on their body and allowed saliva 
that believably contains antiseptic properties to be smeared on 
their bodies. Such caring behavioral acts are proven to be piv-
otal in the ability of termites to adapt to pathogens in confined 
environments.
In addition, healthy termites significantly improve their ability 
to resist infection after grooming sick termites. Seemingly, the 
healthy termites get ‘vaccinated.’ This is akin to what humans 
do when exposing themselves to a disease-causing agent or 
certain types of contaminants. The immunization is then trans-
ferred among healthy termites within the colony. This ‘social 
transfer’ of infection resistance could enhance the fitness of 
colony members (Traniello et al. 1998).
Some termites do not show any signs of mercy to injured 
termites or the newly dead. One study showed that injured 
termites and newly dead termites were highly groomed and 
dragged into tunneling tubes before being cannibalized (Neoh 
et al. 2012). Several reasons accounted for the cannibalism. First, 
termites are wood feeders that readily attack living trees and 
wooden structures that contain little protein. Thus, the limited 
protein in the termites’ diet likely triggers necrophagy or canni-
balism as an alternative protein source. Second, of course, such 
acts are also ways to abolish those which are handicapped and 
incompetent in working for the colony.
However, necrophagy or cannibalism has to be appropriately 
carried out, particularly when encountering old/highly rotten 
dead bodies that might contain comparatively high pathogen 
levels. Consuming highly rotten termite dead bodies could 
potentially spread pathogens among nestmates that would 
be detrimental to colony fitness. With such cases, termites are 
slightly more respectful of their dead, and they choose to bury 
the dead by entombing them where they are discovered. Such 
a phenomenon leads to fanciful conclusions that ‘termites wor-
ship the dead’.
Over time, humans handle the sick and deceased in a re-
spectful and sanitary fashion to prevent disease outbreak as 
part of the handling ritual. Similarly, with termites, those sick and 
dead termites are properly dealt with to ensure that the colo-
ny’s hygiene is maintained at a high level. Though necrophagy 
sounds ‘disrespectful’, it is acted upon as an ecological require-
ment, especially when the benefits (alternative protein source 
and incompetent worker abolishment from colony) outweigh 
the losses (the risk of pathogen spread) that can be potentially 
borne by a given colony. 
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the world, there are two significant reasons for biodiversity de-
cline; overexploitation and habitat change.  Straw-headed Bulbul 
(Pycnonotus zeylanicus), for example, is one of the nearly extinct 
bird species due to overexploitation. This species is known to 
live in lowland forests, but now it is quite difficult to observe. 
Many other forest bird species are now under threat due to hab-
itat change due to deforestation and forest degradation. More 
and more forests are converted into agricultural land, oil palm, 
acacia, and rubber plantations. Intensive logging activities also 
affect bird habitats. Since most birds live in tropical rainforest 
ecosystems, disturbances to forests result in a decrease of bird 
diversity in many areas, which in turn affect traditional cultures 
as well. Only a few old Iban people can practice “Bird Fortune 
Telling” in Borneo. Some bird species are now difficult to see in 
the bird market in Indonesia. Since Biomass Society is the one 
which they share with rich living organisms and ecosystems for 
both their livelihood and culture, it is essential for society to con-
serve biodiversity. 
How do birds respond to habitat changes and human ac-
tivities? What is appropriate landscape management? Logging 
activities are thought to affect bird diversity, but long-term 
research has revealed that logged forests can be a habitat for 
many bird species, if they are managed sustainably (Meijaard et 
al. 2005). Bird species that are known to be sensitive to logging 
activities include terrestrial insectivore species, and low- to mid-
understory flycatchers. Trogons (Harpactes spp.), woodpeckers 
(Picidae), wren-babblers (Kenopia striata and Napothera spp.) 
and flycatchers (Cyornis spp.) have all been observed as declin-
ing in logged forests. On the other hand, canopy-feeding species 
and frugivore and nectarivore species are known to be resistant 
to logging and do not decline in logged forests. Although there 
are several species that are affected by logging, many species 
are still found in logged forests that have suffered minimal eco-
logical impact. Therefore, sustainably managed logged forests 
can be considered an option for biodiversity conservation in 
tropical rain forests.
Yet, it is modern agricultural land and plantation that has 
huge negative impacts on biodiversity. Forested areas are first 
logged, and then burned if needed to convert the land into 
cropland or for plantation use. This conversion definitely clears 
all the living organisms including birds, animals, plants, insects 
and microorganisms which made up parts of the original for-
est ecosystem. These are completely altered and change into 
another ecosystem. Planted acacia forests, for example, look 
like nice forests, but they actually used herbicide and very few 
other trees exists inside them. The use of herbicides causes the 
decline of insect and fruit diversity, which is quite important as 
a food source for birds. As a result of the conversion of natural 
forest to planted acacia forest, sallying insectivore species, usu-
ally inhabit dense tropical rain forest, such as trogons, broadbills, 
drongos, jungle-flycatchers, and philentomas. These are known 
Human beings have long coexisted with living organisms for food, medicine, constructions, and clothes. Living or-
ganisms constitute an ecosystem, which resides at a higher 
categorical scale, such as a “tropical rain forest ecosystem” or 
“mangrove ecosystem.” These living organisms and ecosystems 
have numerous direct and indirect functions which benefit 
human well-being. In tropical countries in Southeast Asia, where 
a wide range of organisms have created some of the richest bio-
diversity and ecosystems in the world, rich and diverse peoples 
and cultures have also been created. Tropical societies benefit 
highly from this rich biodiversity. One of the outstanding cul-
tures that derive from the existing rich bird fauna is “Bird Fortune 
Telling” of the Iban people in Borneo. They have used the oc-
currence of certain bird species to decide their behavior for a 
better future. Another example is keeping wild birds at home 
by Indonesian (mostly Javan) people. The Javanese people are 
known to have a tremendous amount of bird species in trade. 
Birds that have beautiful songs such as White-rumped Shama 
(Copsychus malabaricus), or those that can mimic human talk 
such as Hill Myna (Gracula religiosa) have a higher asking price. 
Keeping birds at home can be observed in many temperate 
countries including Japan, China and some countries in Europe, 
but those in Indonesia are characterized by being kept as part of 
a widespread pastime that has deep cultural roots in Java, and 
its high diversity of bird species. The Kayan people in Borneo 
have used the tail feather of Hornbill, especially Rhinoceros 
Hornbill (Buceros rhinoceros), for their traditional hats and other 
ornaments. Birds’ nest has been harvested and traded since the 
16th century from Southeast Asia to China. What this shows us 
is that birds, especially forest birds, have been deeply related to 
their livelihood and culture.
However, nowadays, bird diversity is decreasing in most trop-
ical areas. In Malaysia and Indonesia, where tropical rain forests 
are characterized by the richest biodiversity and ecosystems in 
Sustainable use of Rich Bird Diversity in “Biomass Society”
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 Scarlet-rumped Trogon (Harpactes duvaucelii ) is restricted to living in the dense 
tropical rain forest.
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The sustainable utilization of bio-resources has been a central 
issue in “Biomass Society.” Among all forest products of tropical 
East Asia, birds’ nests are one of the most valuable products in 
Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia. Two species of swift-
let produce edible birds’ nests, which are known as a Chinese 
delicacy: Edible-nest Swiftlet (Aerodramus fuciphagus hereinafter 
referred as to A. fuciphagus) and Black-nest Swiftlet (Aerodramus 
maximus, hereinafter referred as to A. maximus). Both species are 
similar in morphology, but they can be distinguished by their 
nests; A. fuciphagus produce a “white nest” with less feathers in-
corporated, while A. maximus produce a “black nest” with more 
feathers incorporated in them. Both nests have been harvested 
and traded between Southeast Asia and China for hundreds of 
years. In the mountain area of Borneo Island, where limestone 
forms natural caves, several are known to produce black and 
white nests, and these have been treated as property inher-
ited and passed down from parents to children kids. In some 
areas, caves belong to the whole community, and each family 
or group has the right to harvest in rotation. 
Since birds’ nest-yield much money to the cave owner, they 
try to maximize nest production by frequently harvesting all 
the nests. This means that all the nests which still have eggs or 
chicks have been harvested, before the fledglings leave them. 
This has led to the reduction of the swiftlet population, as they 
to be absent from planted acacia forests. On the other hand, 
the extensive management of rubber plantations is known to 
increase bird diversity to some extent. Known as Jungle Rubber 
on Sumatra island in Indonesia, plantation workers plant rubber 
trees with very limited management practices such as weeding, 
the use of herbicide, pesticides and fertilizers. Therefore, many 
other trees, bushes and herbs are seen in extensively managed 
rubber forests, which could be a habitat for several forest bird 
species. Compared to modern and intensively managed rub-
ber gardens and planted acacia forest, more forest birds have 
been seen in extensively managed rubber forest (Danielsen and 
Heegaard 1995). But, extensively managed rubber forest can-
not be a substitute for natural tropical rain forest. Even though 
species diversity is higher in extensively managed rubber forest, 
the community composition in rubber and natural tropical rain 
forest is quite different. Therefore, natural tropical rain forest has 
an irreplaceable value in terms of bird diversity conservation, es-
pecially in regards to dense tropical forest species. Extensively 
managed rubber forest, on the other hand, could be an im-
portant habitat for birds in open forest environments in village 
areas. From a productive point of view, extensive management 
is not preferred. But in Sumatra island, an extensive way of man-
aging rubber has been used for decades, by local villagers who 
at the same time, possess many other crops. 
Sustainable use of Rich Bird Diversity in “Biomass Society”
Jungle rubber forest is managed extensively and lots of native trees, shrubs, and 
herbs can be seen.
Building Swiftlet farmhouse in Sarawak, Malaysia.
Edible-nest Swiftlet (Aerodramus fuciphagus fuciphagus) in the farmhouse.
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did not allow parents to breed. Therefore, the nest production 
in Bornean limestone cave significantly declined by the end of 
20th century. 
However, at the end of the 20th century, an outstanding tech-
nique originated from Java Island, Indonesia, that revolutionized 
the birds’ nest industry known as “swiftlet farming.” Before the 
technique was introduced, birds’ nest harvesting was a tough 
and dangerous job. People needed to go into the dark cave, 
harvest the nest that is high up in the cave ceiling, using a hand-
made ladder that looks like a big tripod made of bamboo or 
timber. This meant that some people died when they fell from 
the top of the ladder while harvesting the nests. Caves in Java 
were one of the most difficult places to enter, since they are 
mostly located on coastal cliffs, and the cave entrance is located 
either in the upper part of the cliff, which is difficult to enter 
into, or the lateral part of the cliff which required the use of 
small ships to enter from the sea. Swiftlet farming is a mixture of 
several techniques; (1) building and maintaining a farmhouse, 
(2) calling the birds, and (3) the cross fostering of eggs. Out of 
these, the third technique was the most outstanding and influ-
ential one. The cross fostering of swiftlet eggs is quite unique 
and considered as “artificial brood parasitism.” The problem that 
people faced after building a farmhouse is that other species, 
Collocalia esculenta entered the structure. This is a widespread 
species that usually make nests under roofs. What people did is 
that they changed the egg of C. esculenta with that of A. fucipha-
gus in its nest and let the C. esculenta parents hatch and rear the 
A. fuciphagus chicks. After the chicks left the nest, people then 
changed the condition of the farmhouse, by closing the win-
dow left only with small openings and darkened the room so 
no light penetrated from outside, to make it resemble the cave 
environment. Since the Collocalia group does not have “ecolo-
cating” ability such as the Aerodramus groups, they cannot enter 
the farmhouse without light. Thus, the farmhouse becomes oc-
cupied by A. fuciphagus. 
At present, this farmhouse can be seen everywhere in Java, 
Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sarawak, and the Malay Peninsula. Thanks 
to the spread of farmhouses in Indonesia, and a subsequent 
population increase, swiftlets were not listed in the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (CITES) appendix, that bans the international trade of bio-
resources. This technique has increased the abundance of all 
the whole birds’ nest that are in trade. Many Indonesian, mainly 
Chinese-Indonesians has made big money through nest pro-
duction. However, except for Java, the bird that goes into the 
farmhouses is different from the subspecies that was originally 
seen in each place. A. fuciphagus fuciphagus is the Javan sub-
species that is used for farmhouse production. They are quite 
adaptive to many places mostly in the wetlands of Sumatra, 
Kalimantan and Sarawak, whereas other subspecies such as A. 
fuciphagus vestitus do not go into the farmhouse and its range is 
still restricted to the limestone caves in Borneo. The rapid domi-
nance of Javan subspecies A. fuciphagus fuciphagus might have 
some impact on the ecology of native subspecies, but very little 
is known. This subspecies is a “successful” species that symbi-
otically coexists alongside human-beings. What has made the 
differences of adaptability between different subspecies is still 
unknown. What remains is to clarify the biology of the swiftlet 
and its ecology and environment, for future sustainable birds’ 
nest harvesting and production in Southeast Asia. 
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Equator Asia,” the new tourism promotion tagline of BIMP-EAGA (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines – East ASEAN Growth 
Area), was launched in Bandar Seri Begawan in January 2010 with 
much enthusiasm and optimism. Not only did the much-touted 
“growth polygon” come up with a more catchy tourism promotion 
brand, but it also capped an important milestone in its two-de-
cade long effort to integrate the different areas in its vast territory. 
Tourism development in BIMP-EAGA, therefore, provides a valu-
able insight into on the process of regional integration and on 
how newly-charted geo-bodies can serve as platforms not only 
to promote economic development, but also to highlight forgot-
ten cultural linkages and other possibilities for building a wider 
regional community.
Instantly, the term “Equator Asia” hints of sun-drenched 
paradisiacal places located at the center of the world. Indeed, 
geographically, it has a focal location although in political and 
economic terms, the subregion has long subsisted on the pe-
ripheries of development. Except for the small sultanate of Brunei 
Darussalam, which is entirely situated in the BIMP-EAGA, the other 
component areas of subregion share common characteristics of 
considerable distance from their national capitals. This political re-
moteness apparently hampered the immediate access to some of 
the essential infrastructure, investment, and other development 
incentives. Moreover, the weak grasp of state power has turned 
these peripheral territories into havens for pirates, insurgents, and 
terrorists. This condition resulted in security issues and overall 
social instability, particularly in some parts of Indonesia and the 
Philippines. Since the 1960s, rampant violence and relative under-
development has given the area the negative image of a “dead 
zone.”  
BIMP-EAGA is made up of the entire sultanate of Brunei 
Darussalam; the federal states of Sabah and Sarawak, the federal 
territory of Labuan in Eastern Malaysia; the islands of Mindanao 
and Palawan in the Philippines; all of the provinces in Kalimantan, 
Sulawesi, the Maluku island chain, and Irian Jaya in Indonesia. It 
covers a land area of approximately 1.54 million square kilometers 
and is home to about 55 million people. The “growth polygon” was 
launched in 1994 to promote economic development, the lack of 
which was largely seen as a major contributing factor to the secu-
rity problems and other issues that have hounded the subregion. 
By bringing down national barriers, both the public and private 
sectors were afforded opportunities to expand their resource base 
and market area into its cross-border neighbors. It was hoped that 
this strategy would improve export competitiveness and enhance 
the attractiveness of the subregion to local and foreign investors 
(BIMP-EAGA 2008). A smooth take-off was untimely shot down by 
the turbulence that arose in the aftermath of  the 1997 Financial 
Crisis. Since early 2000s, efforts to revitalize BIMP-EAGA has steadily 
gained momentum. However, the volatile global economic system 
as well as the changing national and regional political environment 
has both served as hindrances in regaining the overall vibrancy 
which defined its early years.
Tourism as an Engine of Growth
Since its inception, the proponents of the BIMP-EAGA have set 
their eyes on tourism to be one of the “main pillars” of the sub-
region’s development. The industry’s good prospects were made 
convincing by the steadily rising number of visitors to its various 
tourist destinations. From 1.5 million in 1995, international tourist 
arrivals rose to 3.6 million in 2006, further increasing to 4.5 million in 
2009 (BIMP-EAGA 2010). Apart from its strong potential for growth, 
the industry was also valued for its capacity to foster collabora-
tion among stakeholders from the four member countries. With 
these good prospects, the subregion aimed to transform the ex-
pansive seas and vast rainforests that have long served as barriers 
between the component areas into corridors of integrated tour-
ist destinations and other development networks that would link 
fragmented communities to each other. With its focal role, tourism 
has been positioned to serve as a catalyst to the development of 
other industrial sectors through cooperation and partnerships in 
the public and private sectors. 
During the early years of the BIMP-EAGA, a number of impor-
tant cross-border economic ties were established, which provided 
a great deal of optimism for its future. Among these projects were 
the opening of a Malaysian motorcycle factory in Zamboanga City, 
Philippines; an investment link-up between a construction firm in 
Sarawak and a logging company in Kalimantan; and other similar 
transactions in banking, transportation, fisheries, and consumer 
products (GTZ 2006a, Kurus 1997). The subregion’s most prominent 
project, however, was the Samal Resorts and Casino, a $250 million 
development, which opened with much fanfare in 1998. The resort 
complex was built in Davao, Philippines and its main investor is 
Ekran Berhad, a major real estate conglomerate in Malaysia. Overall, 
this flagship project reflects the important role that the tourism 
industry plays in the newly-established subregion.
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Unfortunately, the 1997 Financial Crisis and the Muslim insur-
gency problem in Western Mindanao that escalated into an all-out 
war during that period applied an untimely brake on the fast-track-
ing tourism industry in the Davao region. Ultimately, the resort was 
forced to close its doors in 2000, only two years after its much-
publicized opening. Several plans to re-open the resort has been 
put forward in the past ten years but the large amount of money 
needed to put it back into operation has deterred potential inves-
tors. The Samal Resorts and Casino complex continue to crumble, 
a persistent reminder of BIMP-EAGA’s unfulfilled potential; the 
encroaching undergrowth serves as a symbolic representation of 
the various problems that serve as obstacles along its long road to 
recovery.  
Cooperation and Competition
As it tries to respond to the changing economic conditions 
in the 21st century, BIMP-EAGA shifted from its early growth area 
model of functional cooperation to a more focused strategy to 
take advantage of “similarities and complementarities in a nar-
row range of agribusiness and eco-tourism activities” (ADB 2004: 
ix). Specifically, this new strategy also encouraged the regional-
ization of production processes which resulted in the creation of 
the Joint Tourism Promotion and Marketing Program. Apart from 
this initiative, the BIMP-EAGA’s Joint Tourism Development (JTD) 
Working Cluster also initiated the establishment of better air con-
nectivity between the subregion’s main urban centers; convene 
conventions for the different tourism industry stakeholders; initiate 
capability building assistance; and support tourism infrastructure 
development (BIMP-EAGA 2008). 
Despite the availability of a well-crafted platform for coopera-
tion,  most of the cross-border tourism development projects were 
unsuccessful. One of the main reasons for this failure is the fact that 
those stakeholders who were expected to cooperate were also 
competitors. With largely comparable attractions such as dive sites, 
mountain trails, and indigenous culture, component areas com-
pete for the limited number of tourists that venture into the area. 
Thus when the Sabah-Palawan Pilot Project was started, accord-
ing to a published report, “Sabah based operators were concerned 
that the joint venture would lead to a loss of business for their 
operations since visitors could spend less time in Sabah in order 
to travel to Palawan” (GTZ 2006b). In addition, tour operators in 
Malaysia were frustrated with their partners from Kalimantan who 
acted slowly because they have to deal with red tape in the more 
centralized Indonesian bureaucracy. Finally, even stakeholders be-
tween the neighboring states of Sabah and Sarawak in Malaysia 
compete with each other. When the Japanese government orga-
nized a trip for tourism officials from BIMP-EAGA to promote the 
recovery of the disaster-ravaged Sendai region, delegates from 
Sabah voiced their objection when they saw that there are more 
participants from Sarawak. Apparently, the art of straddling be-
tween cooperation and competition is one of the paradoxes of 
partnerships that the BIMP-EAGA stakeholders have to negotiate 
as they try to maximize the benefits that they can obtain while try-
ing to cultivate a healthy relationship with other players.
As competitors come with their varying resources and capaci-
ties, some tend to benefit more from the opportunities afforded by 
the expanding industry. In 2010, a report stated that 71 percent of 
the total tourist arrivals in the subregion go to Sabah and Sarawak 
(BIMP-EAGA 2010). The rest of the component areas have to rely 
largely on domestic tourists to sustain themselves. Although this 
figure can be attributed to a number of factors, it shows that the ca-
pacity to attract tourists relies primarily on individual government’s 
(local and national) capacity to build essential infrastructure and 
formulate  good marketing strategies to tap into a volatile interna-
tional tourism market. In fact, external funding has sustained much 
of the cooperative efforts. Particularly, the Joint Tourism Marketing 
and Promotion Program and other cross-border projects were all 
funded by external agencies such as the Asian Development Bank, 
the German Technical Cooperation Agency, and the ASEAN-Japan 
Center. This suggests that without external support, the “Equator 
Asia” banner will eventually disintegrate into a collage of brochures 
to promote individual towns, cities, or regions in the subregion as 
tourist destinations. 
Creating a New Asia
Despite its limitations, tourism has successfully put BIMP-EAGA 
on the world map. “’Equator Asia’ will help to promote another 
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Tourists get a chance to learn about an indigenous group through their dance, 
Monsopiad Cultural Village, Sabah.
Equator Asia Logo. Source: http://bimpeaganorthsulawesi.org
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Asia,” wrote Luc Citrinot, the managing editor of a global tourism 
industry newsletter journal (Citrinot 2010). Apart from raising a 
greater awareness of the subregion among travelers, the new tour-
ism promotion brand also casts a positive light on a region that 
has long had an uninviting reputation. From the late 17th century, 
the area was the location of an earlier form of a “growth triangle.” 
The historian James Warren described a trade relation among the 
British, the Chinese and the Sulu, which defined much of the eco-
nomic activity in the area that is now called BIMP-EAGA. According 
to him: 
In order to have goods to barter for Chinese tea, 
the British traded firearms to Sulu in exchange for its 
sea and forest products. These labor-intensive products 
in turn needed a large number of slaves to gather them. 
Such were obtained by the Sulus from the Ilanun and 
Balangingi Samal in exchange for the guns to be used on 
their slaving raids throughout the Christian Philippines 
and much of the rest of Southeast Asia. (Warren, 1985: xi): 
Hence, the area became a notorious haunt of pirates and slave 
raiders that were only controlled in the late 19th century when the 
availability of steamships enabled the British, Dutch, and Spanish 
colonial governments to conduct more efficient patrols. However, 
piracy activities resurfaced during the post-colonial period when 
the new struggling nation-states started to loose their grip on 
the area (Eklof 2005). Later on, the Muslim insurgency in south-
ern Philippines and the Christian-Muslim conflicts in Sulawesi 
and the Maluku Islands of Indonesia also contributed to escalat-
ing security problems. Even the inclusion of Sabah and Sarawak to 
the Malaysian Federation in 1963 did not transpire peacefully and 
these two states has since assumed a marginal position vis-à-vis 
mainstream Peninsular Malaysian society. 
Until recently, this unstable peace and order situation and mar-
ginal location continued to propagate an image of a “dead zone” 
where nothing much, in terms of economic development, is going 
on. Thus, “Equator Asia” is attempting to draw a “renewed image” 
rather than  merely sketching  new boundaries to highlight the 
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Locating ‘Green Neoliberalism,’ and
Other Forms of Environmental Governance in Southeast Asia
Keith Barney
Former Researcher CSEAS
In contemporary Lao PDR (Laos), rural areas and communities are experiencing relatively rapid socio-economic and eco-
logical transformations. As part of my postdoctoral fellowship at 
Kyoto University, in April 2012, I made a return visit to a number 
of research locations in southern Laos. In these locations, new 
foreign investments in agri-business, hydropower, and mining 
are driving a ‘nature-intensive’ development strategy (Coronil, 
2000). For the Government of Lao PDR (GoL), attracting quality 
foreign investment and promoting the sustainable manage-
ment of natural resources, represents the primary model for 
increasing state revenues, and delivering improved public 
services.
The stakes for local communities across Laos are significant. 
For critics (e.g. Goldman, 2001), Lao resource policy, as sup-
ported through the development banks and donors, represents 
a “green-neoliberal” development model, which will bind local 
people and ecologies to the logics of global commodity capi-
talism, and usher in new patterns of uneven development, and 
new resource exclusions. Indeed, in neighboring Cambodia, 
Springer (2009) argues that neoliberalism and the process of 
neoliberalization, represents a ‘foremost causal factor’ in the 
continuation of authoritarian politics and political violence in 
that country. 
Yet, there appears a paradox with such portrayals of neolib-
eralism as a hegemonic form of political-economic power in 
Southeast Asia. The other side of the neoliberal coin involves the 
continuing significance of non-neoliberal, or “illiberal” forms of 
governance. In Lao PDR, examples of illiberal or quasi-neoliberal 
institutions include the military; most institutions of the Lao bu-
reaucracy; elites connected to the Lao People’s Revolutionary 
Party (LPRP); as well as private entities whose primary mode 
of profit generation is organized through patronage and rent-
seeking as opposed to market-based competition. There exists 
an internal tension in what, in the case of Indonesia, Hadiz 
and Robison (2005) have called “neoliberal reform and illib-
eral consolidation,” and what Felker (2008, 294) terms “illiberal 
adaptation.” I suggest that the contradictions and the inter-
play between neoliberal and illiberal forces are important to 
locating the real stakes of the political-economic and agrarian- 
environmental transitions proceeding across Southeast Asia. 
In this essay I first outline how different scholars have ap-
proached the concepts of neoliberalism and neoliberal natures, 
before turning to brief examples that highlight some of the ad-
vantages, as well as the limits, of the neoliberalization concept 
for understanding contemporary transformations in rural Laos. 
The essay finishes with a call for further grounded research on 
the connections and contradictions between neoliberal ideolo-
gies, actor-networks, and institutions on the one hand; and the 
persistence of illiberal forms of power and authority in Southeast 
Asia on the other.
Neoliberalism and its Variegations 
In the past decade, a vast and largely critical academic litera-
ture has been established around the concept and ideology of 
neoliberalism, and of neoliberal nature. While this literature is far 
too extensive to review here, as Bakker (2010) argues, neoliber-
alism can be understood as a political doctrine, an economic 
project, a set of regulatory practices, and a process of subject 
formation and mode of governmentality, which are ultimately 
oriented around the concept of “governing through markets.” 
Castree (2010) identifies the key policy tenets of neoliberalism 
as including inter alia: privatization; marketization; state de- 
regulation; market-based re-regulation; the rise of civil society 
to replace state functions; and the making of ‘self-sufficient’ indi-
viduals and communities.  
Although neoliberalism is clearly an ideology that origi-
nated first in the West, it was first applied as a national policy 
framework in Pinochet’s Chile (see Kay, 2002). Some observers 
place the high water mark of neoliberal economic ideology in 
Southeast Asia with the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, and the 
IMF-led bailout and conditions negotiated for Indonesia and 
Thailand. In the 15-year period since the crisis, East Asian gov-
ernments have established huge foreign-exchange reserves as 
part of an explicit strategy to deflect a neoliberal “Washington 
Consensus.” 
To counter simplistic ideas of a spreading homogenous ge-
ography of neoliberalism, scholars have added nuance through 
the associated terms ‘neoliberalisation’ and ‘variegated neoliber-
alism’ (Brenner, Peck and Theodore, 2010). These terms indicate 
the contingent, process-based, and articulated relationships of 
neoliberal actors, policies and processes with national to local 
institutions, discourses, and environments. The role of the state 
under neoliberalism is conceptualized in a complex manner; 
through both the idea of rollback reforms (Reagan-Thatcherism) 
and rollout regulatory reforms (Blair-Clinton Third Way neoliber-
alism). Just as the market is created and regulated by the state, 
‘actually existing’ neoliberalism can similarly be understood as 
articulating with the state and operating through domestic 
social institutions. This can produce some unexpected juxtapo-
sitions, such as neoliberal-authoritarianism under military rule in 
Augusto Pinochet’s Chile (Kay, 2002), or, what Springer (2011), 
has called a system of neoliberalism-patronage-kleptocracy-
violence in Hun Sen’s Cambodia. 
Yet, other scholars have argued that neoliberal ideology 
has only selectively been adopted and deployed by domestic 
classes, actors and institutions in the Southeast Asian region, 
often as a targeted strategy to buttress the political-economic 
power of ruling regimes. Much of the substance of neoliberal 
reforms pushed by donors have been deflected or remain 
unimplemented. Pinning down what specifically is entailed 
in the process of neoliberalization in particular contexts of 
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Southeast Asia can therefore be quite challenging. Indeed, 
different political scientists have conceptualized dominant gov-
ernance patterns in regional countries such as the Philippines 
and Cambodia through the logics of patronage or neo- 
patrimonialism (e.g. Hutchcroft, 1998; Cock, 2010). Moreover, 
in many Southeast Asian countries the role of illiberal actors 
such as the military in the economy and in natural resource 
management can be significant. Laos and Vietnam are nomi-
nally communist, ‘post-socialist’ states where neoliberal actors 
and economic reforms, while present, have arguably been em-
ployed in a highly selective and partial manner by the respective 
ruling parties (see Gainsborough, 2010 on Vietnam). 
Concepts of neo-liberalism and neo-patrimonialism in-
dicate distinct and in many ways competing modes of rule. 
Neoliberalism ultimately indicates rule through market logics, 
not rule through political repression, political assassination, 
kleptocracy, rent seizing, or clientelistic-patronage. Concepts 
such as neoliberalism and neopatrimonialism are therefore 
collapsed together through terms such as ‘articulated neolib-
eralism’ at some cost to conceptual clarity. Hybrid terms such 
as ‘variegated neoliberalism’ also indicate that it is the ‘neolib-
eral’ component which is the focus for analysis and the most 
powerful, dynamic force under consideration. However, in other 
regional studies different authors have switched their emphasis, 
to non-neoliberal national and local institutions. Hill, Park and 
Saito (2012: 19) remark on the extent of changes that would be 
required for East Asian states to become primarily neoliberal in 
character:
“For East Asian states to move to a neoliberal 
market system means not only dismantling existing 
developmental institutions, but also creating new neo-
liberal ones. Full conversion would require changes at 
all levels of East Asian societies: laws, administrative 
practices, norms, and values...” 
Thus, we can think of neoliberal- influenced (but not neces-
sarily neoliberal-dominated) state-society relations in Asia, such 
as how Gainsborough (2010) describe in Vietnam, and Hadiz 
and Robison (2005) in Indonesia. 
In the ‘fragile’ post-conflict Mekong states of Laos and 
Cambodia, one might predict that the global neoliberal project 
would have made especially strong inroads. Yet, in Laos, and 
Cambodia, neoliberalism operates within a distinct national- 
institutional framework which is not always weak. These coun-
tries are also strongly authoritarian, where the rule of dominant 
parties and their patronage systems are unchallenged. Theorists 
of neoliberalism at times appear to underplay the role of such 
domestic, illiberal power groupings in Southeast Asian states in 
considering the actual outcomes of political-economic reforms. 
A second factor is introduced by the significant divide be-
tween policy and practice — and it is in this sense that Laos 
and Cambodia could be considered as ‘weak’ states, particularly 
at the local level. The effects of capacity constraints in the local 
state further splinters the coherence of any overarching, cen-
trally organized regulatory reform, including neoliberal reforms. 
Indeed in Laos and Cambodia the management of the most 
valuable natural resources are rarely free of discretionary elite 
involvement. Powerful local, provincial or national state officials 
seek to control valuable resources and the associated resource 
rents, and such forms of rent-seizing behaviour are often the 
rule, not the exception. 
These characteristics of developing Southeast Asian states 
challenge a coherent conceptualization of a dominant pro-
gram of variegated neoliberalization. This is not to suggest that 
neoliberal actors, policies and reforms are not present in the 
region. From an analytical perspective, perhaps the most in-
teresting task is to examine how the entry of neoliberal forces 
and institutions into the Southeast Asian region alters the bal-
ance of political-economic power within the state, and thereby 
produces new geographical formations of order and authority, 
as opposed to arguing for an interpretation which seeks to ex-
plain all major state transformations as ultimately reflective of a 
global hegemonic process of neoliberalization. To understand 
the emergence of neoliberal forms of governance, and also the 
power of other, competing or alternative governance patterns, 
we need to further understand how political-economic power 
and authority is organized in Southeast Asian states. 
Green Neoliberalism in Southeast Asia
Neoliberal-informed programs and polices have been ap-
plied to numerous environmental sectors in Southeast Asia. 
New programs of marketization (including the expansion of 
new global boom crops such as coffee, shrimp, oil palm, rubber 
and pulpwood), new land titling and decentralization pro-
grams, agribusiness concessions, new market-based policy and 
legal reforms, free trade agreements, certification systems, and 
community-based resource management initiatives, are consis-
tent with a neoliberalization framework. Neoliberalism has also 
made inroads into the ‘final frontier,’ of environmental conser-
vation programs, payments for ecosystem services and carbon 
trading.
It is notable however that few of the key scholarly studies 
of neoliberal nature have been well grounded in Southeast 
Asian contexts. A more precise analytic of the real discursive 
power, as well as the limits of neoliberal nature and environ-
mental governance formations in the region, would seem to be 
useful. In approaching this issue, we might consider the emer-
gence of sub-national or transboundary spaces of neoliberal 
environmental governance, as well as various hybrid histori-
cal-geographical formations. Another approach might involve 
distinguishing between ‘shallow’ or ‘deep’ programs of neoliberal 
governance (e.g. Dressler and Roth, 2012). Alternatively, we might 
question whether a certain sector, policy framework or spatial- 
territorial-environmental configuration could be considered 
as an example of ‘variegated neoliberalism’ in any meaningful 
sense at all. 
Neoliberal Environmental Transformations  
in Rural Laos 
In Laos, many of the manifestations of a neoliberal mode of 
environmental governance are present. Yet, if one digs beneath 
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the surface of boosterish donor or company reports, local re-
alities and the actual outcomes of projects in Laos can be 
significantly more complex. Global ‘neoliberal’ World Bank spon-
sored eco-certified forests are located next to military extractive 
logging enterprises, semi-coercive contract farming enterprises, 
or semi-commercial-based agricultural systems. In other areas, 
‘neoliberal’ state-donor organized land use zoning projects are 
affected by coercive, state-led upland minority resettlement 
programs. Some sustainable hydropower or mining projects 
appear to be modeled on best practice neoliberal approaches, 
while other extractive resource projects do not appear to be 
governed through any coherent legal process at all. Neoliberal-
linked policies and interventions are overlaid upon a distinct 
geographical-historical context and landscape in Laos, with its 
particular sedimented histories of Cold War conflict, and post-
socialist state-society relations.  
One of the most high profile examples of neoliberal envi-
ronmental governance in Laos is the World Bank/Government 
of Finland supported natural forest management program. 
This project has embodied many key neoliberal rationalities: 
marketization of forest resources; the role of international in-
stitutions and experts; the dismantling of Lao state forestry 
enterprises; the creation of sustainable forest communities; new 
spatial forest-land zoning practices; the key role for global eco-
certification bodies, and so forth. Yet, if one digs deeper, this 
apparently dominant mode of governance appears to come un-
done. Required forest inventories, harvesting plans and timber 
tracking procedures are not followed by state officials or sub-
contractors; elite-linked logging firms continue to harvest and 
clear forest illegally; and the planned sale of eco-certified timber 
never quite materializes (Jonsson, 2006; Hodgdon, 2010) 
Overtly illiberal interventions in the Lao forestry sector are 
commonplace. In 2006, a WWF eco-certified sustainable proj-
ect in southern Sekong province was closed by the provincial 
government, when its establishment challenged key actors in-
volved in discretionary timber extraction. More recently, in 2012, 
a donor-led participatory REDD forest management project lo-
cated inside a National Protected Area in Xayaboury province, 
near the Thai border, was reportedly closed by the Lao govern-
ment, due to the establishment of new military buffer protection 
zone along the international border. Much to the frustration of 
international agencies, neoliberalism is far from the dominant 
mode of governance in play in the Lao forest sector. It is still the 
Politburo, the military, provincial governors, and their networks 
in Laos who largely decide how forests will be managed, where 
and when logging will be conducted, and who will control the 
revenues. 
With respect to the plantation and agribusiness sector, neo-
liberal modes of governance forestry are evident, for example, 
the entrance of major multinational corporations, the enclo-
sure and privatization of formerly common property resources; 
the real subsumption of nature into more commodified forms 
such as high-yielding eucalyptus or rubber trees; and the role 
of eco-certification. Yet, corporate investments in forestry are 
still “grounded” in Laos in relation to various alternate governing 
logics of the state— such as the discretionary role of various 
state agencies or individuals in allocating concessions; the 
development of state-private sector joint venture partnerships; 
and the linkages between agribusiness development and GoL 
priorities around the elimination of swidden agriculture and the 
resettlement of upland minority communities. In an example of 
neoliberal concessionary politics meeting regional geopolitics 
and security concerns, there are reports that a major Chinese 
pulpwood company operating in southern Laos is experiencing 
difficulties due to the proximity of their proposed concession 
area to the Lao-Vietnamese border zone, a strategic zone for the 
Vietnamese government.  In other and more locally complex 
ways, the legacy of Cold War still affects how land is allocated for 
concession development (see e.g. Dwyer, Forthcoming; Baird 
and Le Billon, 2012).
Lastly, the commodification of nature under a neoliberal 
investment regime can lead to unexpected outcomes that ap-
pear to escape neoliberal rationalities entirely. In Barney (2011) 
I described the unpredictable and cascading social-ecological 
outcomes that have developed between a major hydropower 
and plantation forestry projects, and smallholder livelihoods in 
a village in central Laos. In this community, the company-led 
neoliberal compensation and mitigation program aimed at cre-
ating ‘self-sufficient,’ commercially-productive farmer-subjects, 
failed to reach the intended beneficiaries, and villagers have 
been left to navigate through the damaging transformations in 
landscape and livelihood that these projects have left in their 
wake. Local responses have including widespread illegal youth 
outmigration to Thailand.
Conclusion: Grounding Neoliberal Natures  
in Southeast Asia
The result of the transformations I have described in Laos 
are a complex hybrid between a neoliberal influenced global 
political economy, the competing rationalities and uneven ca-
pacities of the Lao state, and grounded natural histories and 
social-landscapes. To reduce this disparate assemblage to a de-
rivative sub-type— to a form of ‘green neoliberalism with Lao 
characteristics’— would, I suggest, be to miss the most crucial 
and indeed interesting aspects of how national to local factors 
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strongly influence the making of governable or ungovernable 
spaces and communities in the country. Neoliberal natures are 
an important phenomenon to understand. But I suggest that 
neoliberalism is not currently the dominant mode of political 
or environmental regulation in much of rural Southeast Asia. 
Indeed, the concept of neoliberalization indicates a process of 
becoming increasingly neoliberal in character, which first needs 
to be demonstrated, not assumed. 
While respecting the advantages of parsimonious concep-
tual frameworks, my emphasis has shifted towards ‘grounding’ 
global-neoliberal influenced economic processes in contexts 
and in places. Grounded research points not just to how neo-
liberal institutions and ideologies might influence and become 
embedded within states, social relations and environmen-
tal contexts, but also and importantly, to the persistence and 
continued significance of illiberal actors and institutions, and 
non-neoliberal modes of power and environmental governance 
in Southeast Asia.
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It does not take an expert to tell that more and more people all over Southeast Asia are enjoying unprecedented economic 
stability, which goes well along with a strong drive to enjoy life 
in all of its aspects. And in most cases, all of that comes with-
out too many worries about the future. Saving for harsher times 
does not seem to be a matter of concern, particularly among the 
younger generations, and the preferred choice appears to be 
that of spending. An increasingly thicker portion of the popula-
tion living in the cities can afford lifestyles unthinkable just ten 
years ago, and is conspicuously willing to show that off. The 
expanding economy, higher levels of urbanization, increased 
mobility, and the indisputable current impossibility to control 
most of Southeast Asia’s intra-regional flows have favoured an 
almost unstoppable rise of the entertainment industry in the re-
gion. As many of those who are familiar with the region would 
already know, the meaning attached to the word “entertainment” 
in Southeast Asia is one of a most subjective nature: one that 
oftentimes blurs the line between legality and illegality. And the 
current state of the law allows for a much biased interpretation 
of what is legal and what is not, something too many a time con-
fused (not rarely on purpose) with what is considered to be licit 
and what is instead deemed as illicit.
For that very reason, borderlands are, more than any other 
place in the region, perfect havens for setting up such a business. 
As a matter of fact, in all of mainland Southeast Asia’s countries, 
most of the sectors commonly belonging to the entertainment 
industry are prohibited by law: gambling just as much as prosti-
tution. At the same time, demand is at a historic peak and turning 
one’s back to rivers of easy money does not quite seem to be the 
preferred option. Governments and business people have thus 
craftily thought of a way to meet such a high demand without 
compromising themselves too much, and have so created some 
sort of no-man’s lands right across their national boundaries, 
where they have successfully built entertainment complexes de-
pending almost solely on one-time tourists crossing the border 
for the only purpose of visiting such places. 
In a region where development gaps and historical ties often 
dictate the way countries relate to their neighbors, it is easily un-
derstandable how such limbo-like places are being built on the 
Burmese, Laotian, and Cambodian sides of a common frontier. 
Lured by easy and oftentimes accountability-proof profits, the 
above mentioned countries’ governments too easily overlook 
the extremely serious and intricate chain of issues that inevitably 
ensue from the establishment of such complexes. The case of 
Poipet on the Thai-Cambodian border best explains the multi-
faceted implications of such a choice.
The Poipet-Aranyaprathet is a key crossing point between the 
two countries, linking Bangkok to both Phnom Penh and Siem 
Reap. From Phnom Penh to the border it is a 410 km, 8-hour ride 
on the paved and generally well-maintained National Highway 
5. Transport services are increasing, but, since local demand is 
low, still too few. Poipet is a proper city located in Cambodia’s 
Banteay Meanchey Province. The fact that the city hosts the 
most popular international crossing in the area has undoubt-
edly accelerated its development, which stands in sharp contrast 
against the poorer conditions of Banteay Meanchey Province in 
general. Its official population has doubled over the course of 
a decade. Border activities and trade in general provide busi-
ness and job opportunities that attract people from all parts of 
the country, thus many inhabitants are actually internal labour 
migrants that have moved in from poorer areas as well as refu-
gee camps that used to populate the same border till not long 
ago. General uncertainty about ongoing border disputes and a 
high level of disinformation among locals mean that the larg-
est single source of employment on the Cambodian side is day 
labour, with eight to ten thousand people crossing the border 
each day to transport goods. This phenomenon jumps to the eye 
of even the most inexperienced, as the city’s proper urban de-
velopment is almost inexistent; almost to the same extent as its 
formal industrial sector. Nonetheless, people continue to move 
into town and live in extremely precarious conditions on a day-
by-day basis. As elsewhere in the region, where the economic 
gap between the two sides is significant, the weaker part usu-
ally survives by reaching a compromise with itself, adjusting to a 
sort of limbo that allows it to prosper while vaguely controlling 
the situation. Poipet is unfortunately a place where it could be 
rather unpleasant to stay overnight at. All of its economy seems 
to be gravitating around a quite successful entertainment indus-
try concentrated on a strip a land right between the two border 
gates. It is indeed a no-man’s land. Officially it is on Cambodian 
soil. Practically, Cambodians have restricted access to it. It cur-
rently hosts ten (and increasing) fully-equipped casinos and 
hotels that were built almost uniquely to please clientele from 
neighboring Thailand. Gambling is prohibited in both countries, 
and being this strip literally between the gates, Thai visitors are 
able to reach it without going through Cambodian immigration. 
Being on Cambodian soil, people working at those places are 
almost totally Cambodian nationals, but the profits of the busi-
ness do not seem to remain in Cambodia. Workers at the casinos 
seem to be rather sure about that, arguing about low wages and 
economic conditions outside the strip not improving. Moreover, 
supplies for the casinos are clearly brought in from Thailand 
every morning. 
Corruption at all levels in Poipet is rampant, and the manage-
ment of land rights in the city are ambiguous, to say the least. 
Hence, the situation provides little economic benefit to the 
area. Poipet does not have adequate infrastructure. Brand new 
transport companies have made their appearance in town, sub-
stituting the myriad of private transporters that were available 
everywhere till not long ago. Prices for their services have largely 
inflated, although they do not seem to go entirely to the com-
panies. Drivers, many of whom are the same people who used 
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to do the job individually in the past, are quite talkative persons, 
and they claim that a good share of the profits go to the police, 
which, in turn, have allegedly forced all individual drivers to join 
the new syndicate. The vehicles used are clearly imported from 
Thailand, be it the vans used by the casinos, the buses that carry 
tourists to Siem Reap and Phnom Penh, or the Toyota Camry’s 
used by Poipet taxi drivers. All together, the impression is that 
of a messy border town characterized by a rapid expansion not 
paralleled by equally rapid and organized development.
But what really stands out in the area is flaunted corruption 
at all levels, a widespread cancer that pervades the whole of 
Poipet and appears to be the rule rather than the exception. The 
transport industry is monopolized by a syndicate that, with the 
collaborative support of the police force, prohibits any indepen-
dent exercise of the business. Another syndicate manages the 
land allocation in town, while a third organized group seems to 
be in charge of the labor force particularly that connected to the 
casinos’ and hotels’ industry. In a city apparently in the hands of 
local criminal organizations, the living conditions of its inhabit-
ants are extremely precarious, and whilst customs officials taking 
small bribes could be overlooked, more serious social offences 
are threatening the future of the area. A good half of the popula-
tion has come in from the countryside after the establishment of 
the casinos and the new Rong Klua market on the Thai side. This 
share of new inhabitants is the most prone to being miserably 
exploited by people without scruples. Beggars are everywhere 
to be seen in the area, but the striking majority of them are 
Cambodian. 
But the most serious social issue concerns are the treatment 
of children and the influx of tourists and gamblers that have 
encouraged the sex industry to flourish. These overall factors, 
coupled with the lack of quality, inexpensive education and 
skill training in Cambodia, have allowed child trafficking to take 
a stronghold in Poipet. Many times, poor families are lured into 
sending their children to work in Thailand, with the promise of 
higher wages, general better conditions and a larger number 
of tourists staying in Aranyaprathet before proceeding towards 
other locations in Cambodia. 
Most of the times these children are eventually trafficked, 
forced into prostitution and get often involved in drugs. Field-
observations are particularly disturbing in regard to this point. 
Everybody in the area knows that trafficking is rife, yet nobody 
is willing to talk about it. Statements such as “there are no ille-
gal crossings on our border,” “there is no way people can pass 
through immigration illegally […] because that would require a 
high level of corruption from both Thai and Cambodian officials,” 
and finally “children might be trafficked, but not on our watch,” 
is what Cambodian officials often repeat. Thai officials seem to 
be more realistic, or maybe just diplomatic, and say that “traf-
ficking happens through the immigration post [and people] 
simply cross the border at night, when unseen.” In fact, following 
a pattern common to many other crossings in Southeast Asia, 
people go willingly and illegally across borders and rivers in the 
hundreds every month, with many of them thought to be under-
age. Nevertheless, one farmer, who did not even want to show 
himself, said that he knows for sure that children have been traf-
ficked inside the vans owned by the casinos, because they are 
seldom checked. 
A Cambodian immigration officer in Poipet said that one of 
his duties was to bring back the bodies of Cambodians killed 
in Thailand. According to him, there are several such cases 
every month, with many of them happening in suspicious cir-
cumstances. Because they do not carry papers, it is extremely 
difficult to identify these people, but many among them appear 
to be children, thus adding credibility to the above-mentioned 
allegations.
The fact that so many children are involved in this dirty traffic 
is in itself disgusting enough, but similar stories are shared by 
many young men and women, who are often moved to as far 
as Bangkok. For this very reason, there are several road blocks in 
both directions, from and to the capital, with police forces carry-
ing out regular random checks, but enforcers are overwhelmed 
by the incidence of such occurrences. Fortunately, the central 
authorities of Cambodia have historically been relatively open to 
the support of NGOs to the poor and marginalized. Hence, lead-
ing organ is at ions, first among all World Vision, have recently 
been organizing awareness-raising activities to awaken locals’ 
public opinion to such issues. 
Hopefully, the area will experience a significant improve-
ment in the near future, but with the expanding middle class in 
Thailand and the badly needed strong currency in Cambodia, 
entertainment seems too good a vice to quit. 
Southeast Asia’s New High Rollers
Illegal crossers being repatriated, mostly children.Poipet Casino
31
Questioning Modernity in Indonesia and 
Malaysia
Edited by Wendy Mee and Joel S. Kahn. 2012.
Reading Southeast Asia through Area 
Informatics (in Japanese)
Shibayama Mamoru. 2012. Tokyo: Bensei Publishing
Development Monks in Northeast Thailand
Pinit Lapthananon. 2012. Kyoto University Press
Kyoto CSEAS Series of Asian Studies No. 5 (in English)
Kyoto Area Studies on Asia (in English) No. 22
The Family in Flux in Southeast Asia: 
Institution, Ideology, Practice
Edited by Yoko Hayami, Junko Koizumi, Chalidaporn Songsamphan, 
and Ratana Tosakul. 2012. Chiang Mai: Kyoto University Press and 
Silkworm
Industrialization with a Weak State: Thailand’s 
Development in Historical Perspective
Somboon Siriprachai 2012.
Kyoto CSEAS Series of Asian Studies No. 6 (in English)
Publications
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The Potentiality of Geosphere  and Biosphere: 
Exploring the Tropical Humanosphere
Edited by Masayuki Yanagisawa, Kono Yasuyuki, Kozan Osamu, 
Kanzaki Mamoru. 2012. Kyoto: Kyoto University Press
The Tropical Humanosphere in Global History: 
Beyond the Temperate-zone Perspective
Edited by Kaoru Sugihara, Wakimura Kohei, Fujita Koichi, Tanabe Akio 
2012. Kyoto: Kyoto University Press
Humanosphere Potentiality Index: Beyond the 
HDI Perspective.
Edited by Takahiro Sato, Taizo Wada, Kaoru Sugihara and Yoichi Mine. 
Kyoto: Kyoto University Press
New Light of Myanmar Economy (in Japanese)
Konosuke ODAKA and Fumiharu MIENO, eds. 2012. Tokyo: 
Keiso-shobo 
Traditional Agricultural Implements of 
Bangladesh
Edited by Muhammad SALIM and Kazuo Ando. 2012. Dhaka, 
Bangladesh : Rubi Enterprise
Reconstituting the Human Domain: 
The Potentialities of Tropical Societies
Edited by Hayami Yoko, Nishi Makoto, Kimura Shuhei 2012. Kyoto: 
Kyoto University Press
Humanosphere Lectures Vol. 2 (in Japanese)
Humanosphere Lectures Vol. 1 (in Japanese) Humanosphere Lectures Vol. 5 (in Japanese)




CSEAS is accepting applicants semiannually for about 14 
positions for scholars and researchers who work on Southeast 
Asia, or any one of the countries in that region, to spend 3 to 
12 months in Kyoto to conduct research, write, or pursue other 
scholarly activities in connection with their field of study. Since 
1975, more than 270 distinguished scholars have availed them-
selves of the Center’s considerable scholarly resources and 
enjoyed the invigorating atmosphere of scenic Kyoto, the an-
cient capital of Japan and the main repository of the country’s 
cultural treasures, to pursue their interests in Southeast Asian 
Area Studies. The Center’s multi-disciplinary character and the 
diverse research interests of its faculty offer visiting scholars an 
ideal opportunity for the exchange of ideas and the cultivation 
of comparative perspectives. The highly competitive selection 
process has brought to the Center in recent years researchers 
from Southeast Asian countries, Bangladesh, China, Korea, and 
western countries including the United States and France. The 
visiting fellows represent various basic disciplines in their study of 
Southeast Asia, and their official posts in their home institutions 
include teacher, researcher, librarian, journalist, and NGO worker. 
Information and Technology (IT) experts who conduct research 
on Southeast Asia are also joining the Center, not only to man-
age various database systems but also to construct academic 
networks for area study throughout the world. Successful ap-
plicants receive an appropriate stipend to cover international 
travel, housing, and living expenses in Kyoto. Research funds will 
also be provided to facilitate his/her work. Funds will also be al-
located for domestic travel, subject to government regulations, 
and a number of other facilities are available to visiting scholars. 
Fellows will be expected to reside in Kyoto for the duration of 
their fellowship period. Fellows are normally invited to deliver 
a public lecture during their term at the Center and encour-
aged to submit an article for possible publication in the Center’s 
journal, Southeast Asian Studies and to contribute to the online 
journal Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia. CSEAS also received re-
searchers, both Japanese and foreign, who visit on their own 
funds or on external fellowships.
Name Period Affiliation/Position Research Title
Paderanga, Cayetano Jr. Woo 4.27.2012~9.30.2012
Professor, School of Economics, 
University of the Philippines, Secretary 
of Socioeconomic Planning, National 
Economic and Development Authority
Financial Sector in the Philippines; 
Technocracy in the Philippines
Riba, Tomo 5.1.2012~10.31.2012
 Associate Professor, Department of 
Geography, Faculty of Environmental 
Sciences, Rajiv Gandhi University
Shifting Cultivation and Tribal Culture in 
Arunachal Pradesh, India
Harjono, Hery 6.1.2012~11.30.2012
 Professor, Research Center for 
Geotechnology, Indonesian Institute of 
Sciences (LIPI)
Building a Soft System of Natural 
Disaster
Song, Xianfeng 7.1.2012~12.31.2012
Professor, College of Resources and 
Environment, Graduate University of 
Chinese Academy of Sciences
Development of Web-GIS framework 
for Soil Mapping and Modeling of Soil 
Dynamics for Sustainable Resource 
Management
Evans, Grant Richard James 8.1.2012~1.31.2013 Academic Advisor, Lao Academy of Social Sciences Lao Essays
Cairns, Malcolm Foster 9.1.2012~2.28.2013 Independent Environment Anthropologist
The Quest of Naga Headhunters for More 
Agricultural Land and the Pivotal Role of 
an Alder Tree
Shih, Virginia Jing-yi 9.1.2012~2.28.2013
Librarian, International and Area Studies 
Department, University of California, 
Berkeley
Crossroads of International Southeast 
Asia Scholarship & Librarianship: the 
Past, Present and Future
Jeong, Yeonsik 4.1.2012~2.28.2013 Professor, Faculty of International Relations, Changwon National University
Vietnamese Students during Study in 
Japan Movement (1905-1909)
Islam, Md. Taufiqul 5.11.2012~11.10.2012
 Assistant Professor, American 
International University-Bangladesh 
(AIUB)
Dimension of Empowerment and Rural 
Local Government in India: Lesson for 
Bangladesh
Leveau, Arnaud 6.25.2012~8.21.2012 Ph.D. Candidate, Lyon Institute of East Asian Studies
A Brief Comparison between the 
Japanese and South Korean Approaches 
on Southeast Asia: The Case of Thai 
Studies
Hara, Kimie 7.1.2012~8.7.2012
Professor, Renison Research Professor 
in East Asian Studies, Renison University 
College / Departments of History and 
Political Science, University of Waterloo
After San Francisco: Post-World War II 
Japanese Peace Treaty and the Regional 
Conflicts in East Asia
Muhammad, Ahmad 7.1.2012~9.28.2012
Senior Lecturer, Department of Biology, 
Faculty of Mathematics & Natural 
Sciences, Riau University
Socio-ecological Study of Adaptations 
and Sustainability in Indonesian Rubber 
Smallholdings
Kimura, Ehito 5.20.2012~7.30.2012 Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Hawai’i at Manoa
Post-authoritarian Politics in Indonesia in 
a Comparative Perspective
Tejawaree, Jakkree 7.4.2012~8.3.2012 M.A. (IPED), Fordham University
Collaborating Research on International 
Trade and Foreign Direct Investment dur-
ing the Political and Economic Transition 
of Myanmar
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Announcement of new Southeast Asian Studies, published by the 
Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University  
In April 2012, CSEAS re-launched Southeast Asian Studies as an all-English journal. Intended for a re-
gional as well as global readership, Southeast Asian Studies will be published three times a year.  
The new journal aims to promote excellent, agenda-setting scholarship and provide a forum for 
dialogue and collaboration both within and beyond the region. Southeast Asian Studies engages in 
wide-ranging and in-depth discussions that are attuned to the issues and debates within the region, 
while affirming the importance of learning and sharing ideas on a cross-country, global, and histori-
cal scale.  An integral part of the journal’s mandate is to foster scholarship that is not just empirically 
grounded and multidisciplinary, but capable of bridging the continuing divide in area studies be-
tween the social sciences and humanities, on the one hand, and the natural sciences, on the other. 
To this end, the journal includes accessibly written articles that build on insights and cutting-edge 
research from the natural sciences.  We accept articles all year round.
Inquiries: english-editorial@cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp
Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University
CSEAS Life and Green Visual Documentary Project
Organized under the CSEAS “Toward Sustainable Humanosphere” 
Program and JSPS Asian Core Program.
“Care” in Southeast Asia: Every Day and into the Future
The Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University is accepting proposals from independent, 
young and upcoming filmmakers from Southeast Asia to make and submit documentaries which deal with 
the topic of “care.”
Care is fundamental to human co-existence and mutuality. At the heart of this view of care is a relational 
perspective on human existence. Yet care is a western term that has no exact corresponding term in Asian 
languages. We hope that this project will stimulate Southeast Asian filmmakers into considering the rel-
evance and meaning of care in their own societies. 
Over the last 30 years, demographic changes in the region have led to a reorganization of social rela-
tions. How individuals, families and communities cope with the issue of care has become an increasingly 
important issue. Different forms of care exist in different cultural and social settings and the young, elderly 
and disabled all receive care and exert a moral claim to it.
The practice of care produces relations between the cared and carers in various social contexts. It is a 
lived practice concerned with the physical and psychosocial needs of  particular persons. Relationships 
are formed by recognizing that bodies and their care at different stages in the human lifecycle form a 
fundamental foundation for the construction of societies. In Southeast Asia, these relationships are highly 
diverse and different care practices vary from country to country. In part this arises from unstable policy 
and institutional support.
We are accepting proposals from independent, young and upcoming filmmakers from Southeast Asia 
on documentaries which deal with the topic of care. The deadline for submission is 25 January 2013. 
http://sea-sh.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/visual_documentary_project/ 
For more information please contact Mario Lopez marioivanlopez@cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp
and Jafar Suryomenggolo jafar@cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp 
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